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Abstract : While the topic of gender equality turns out to be an important element in the preparation
of Turkey to join the European Union, very little empirical research on this issue has been done using Turkish
data. This paper aims to contribute toward filling this gap. We propose an estimate of the wage discrimination
in Turkey relying on different decompositions of the gender wage differential. The data set used is the 2003
Turkish Household Budget Survey. In Turkey, the observed average gender wage gap is about 25.2% in favor of
men for the salaried population, and around 60% of it may be attributed to discrimination. In terms of gender
wage discrimination, with an observed wage gap close to those observed in France and Italy, and a discrimination
component close to the ones obtained in Spain and Greece with comparable methods, Turkey happens to do not
so bad. But, in the Turkish case, wage discrimination appears to be a bad indicator of gender inequalities in the
labor market, as exclusion and segregation of women are the main concerns.
Keywords: discrimination, gender wage gap decompositions, Turkey.
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Re´sume´ : Si le the`me de l’e´galite´ des sexes se re´ve`le eˆtre un sujet sensible dans les discussions pre´paratoires
a` une future adhe´sion de la Turquie a` l’Union Europe´enne, peu de travaux empiriques ont e´te´ mene´s sur donne´es
turques. Cet article propose une estimation de la discrimination salariale sur le marche´ du travail turc a` partir
de diffe´rentes de´compositions de l’e´cart de salaires hommes-femmes, sur la base de l’Enqueˆte me´nage 2003. Il
apparaˆıt, qu’en moyenne, en Turquie, sur la population salarie´e, un homme touche 25,2% de plus qu’une femme,
et qu’environ 60% de cet e´cart peut eˆtre attribue´ a` des pratiques discriminatoires. Du point de vue de la discri-
mination salariale, avec un e´cart de salaires observe´ du meˆme ordre que ceux constate´s en France et en Italie, et
une part attribue´e a` la discrimination, a` partir de me´thodes directement comparables, proche de celles obtenues
sur l’Espagne et la Gre`ce, la Turquie se situe dans les standards europe´ens. Mais, dans le cas turc, les limites des
mesures de discrimination salariale comme indicateur des ine´galite´s hommes-femmes sur le marche´ du travail appa-
raissent clairement, l’exclusion et la se´gre´gation e´tant les proble`mes majeurs auxquels sont confronte´es les femmes.
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1 Introduction
”If a society does not walk towards its objective with all women and all men who compose
it, it will not progress.”
Mustafa Kemal Atatu¨rk
While Turkey’s accession negotiations to the European Union began in October 2005, the topic of
gender equality has turned out to be an important element in the preparation of the country to join the
Union. Reports after reports, the European Commission underlines the incompleteness of the Turkish
alignment process on the Community acquis in the area of non-discrimination and gender equality. The
2006 Commission’s report notes, as regards equal opportunities, that alignment is required in respect of
the Community acquis, in particular concerning parental leave, equal pay, equal access to employment
and statutory and occupational social security.
If the question of discriminating practices against women in the Turkish labor market is a recurrent
point of debate between the organisms of the Community and the Turkish government — point all
the more sensitive that inevitably linked in common minds to cultural and religious factors — there is
actually very few quantitative studies on this topic going beyond the simple statements of the very low
employment rate for women and a wage differential disfavoring them.
However, we know that such statements are not sufficient to draw conclusions in terms of discrimina-
tion against women. In fact, wage gaps may be justified by objective reasons, for instance productivity
differences between men and women, themselves explained by differences in education or training. The
approach the most commonly used in the literature to measure and analyze wage discrimination is based
on wage gap decompositions in the line of the one first proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973).
The idea of these decompositions is to isolate, in the gender wage differential, the part due to differences
in the observable characteristics of the individuals, from the part which can not be explained by these
differences, generally attributed to discrimination.
Even though this approach of wage discrimination may be, and has been criticized on different grounds,
it is nevertheless the one we will follow here as our main concern is comparability. Indeed, the present
contribution is not intended to propose methodological improvements on the empirical treatment of wage
discrimination but to situate Turkey in terms of gender wage discrimination relative to the EU countries.
As far as we know, one of the most recent and comprehensive study on gender wage discrimination
implemented on a large sample of European countries is the one proposed by Meurs and Ponthieux
(2005). This study presents the great advantage of using recent data — the 7th wave (2000) of the
ECHP data set — and applying to the different countries concerned1 a perfectly homogeneous method.
To make possible the comparison with Turkey, we chose to follow the same approach based on different
decompositions of the gender wage gap, completed with a Heckman’s two-steps procedure (1979) in order
to correct for selectivity. The data set used is the 2003 Household Budget Survey conducted by the
Turkish Institute of Statistics.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give few key statistics to briefly present the
current state of the Turkish labor market and the space it makes for women. We then describe our data.
Section 3 presents our findings with respect to the observed gender gaps in a series of figures. Section
1The analysis is done for 10 countries of the EU : Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom.
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4 contains the results of the wage equations’ estimates and our decomposition analysis of the gender
wage gaps in Turkey. In section 5 we complete our analysis by a treatment of selectivity based on the
Heckman’s two-steps procedure (1979) in order to estimate the selectivity corrected wage gap. In the
last section, we compare our results with the ones obtained using the same methodology by Meurs and
Ponthieux (2005) on European countries.
2 Women in the Turkish labor market
2.1 Some Key Statistics
One of the most serious structural handicap penalizing Turkey in the negotiation process on its future
membership in the EU is the state of its labor market. The low employment rate, the high level of
unemployment, the size of the informal economy, and the strong disparities between rural an urban areas
are the main challenges that Turkey has to take up in terms of employment policy.
Labor force participation in Turkey is exceptionally low by international standards and has been in
long-term declining. The overall participation rate of 48.7 % in 2004 was the lowest in the OECD and
21.4 percentage points below the OECD average (Table 1). According to the World Bank (2006), from
1980 to 2004, the working age population (those aged from 15 to 64) grew by 23 million in Turkey, but
only 6 million net jobs were created. As a result, the employment rate (the percentage of working age
population that is employed) in 2004, at 43.7%, is one of the lowest in the world. Most countries have
employment rates in excess of 50%2 ; the EU-15 average in 2004 was 65 %.
Tab. 1 – Labor Force Participation and Employment, 2004
Population 15+ Labor force Employment Participation rate Employment rate
Thousands Thousands Thousands Percent Percent
Total 49,906 24,290 21,791 48.7 43.7
Female 25,150 6,388 5,768 25.4 22.9
Male 24,756 17,902 16,023 72.3 64.7
Urban 30,813 13,714 11,844 44.5 38.4
Female 15,450 2,832 2,325 18.3 15.0
Male 15,363 10,882 9,519 70.8 62.0
Rural 19,093 10,576 9,948 55.4 52.1
Female 9,700 3,556 3,443 36.7 35.5
Male 9,393 7,020 6,505 74.7 69.3
Memo item :
OECD Total 70.1 65.3
Source : SIS, HLFS, and OECD Employment Outlook 2005.
Participation and employment rates differ significantly with respect to gender and location. Rural
participation and employment rates are higher than urban and men’s are higher than women’s. For the
economy overall, the male participation rate (72.3 %) is nearly three times the female rate (25.4 %).
In urban areas, women’s labor force participation is exceptionally low, at only 18.3 % versus 70.8% for
2The exceptions are largely in the Middle-East.
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men (Table 1). Actually, a significant part of the gap between the employment rate in Turkey and the
EU-15 comes from the very low employment rate for women. According to the World Bank (2006), the
employment rate in 2004 in Turkey was 64.7 % for men, while in the EU-15 it was 72.9. By contrast,
the average for women, 22.9 %, was less than half the EU-15 average of 57.1%. Thus, by 2004, less than
one in four Turkish women aged 15-64 was employed. Moreover, according to studies by the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the female participation rate has
dropped to around 20% from 1998 to 2004, in contrast to the rise of women’s participation in the
informal sector. These evolutions are the result of the combination of a range of sociological, cultural
Tab. 2 – Educational Attainment, 1988 and 2003 (% of population)
Population Men Women
1988 2003 1988 2003 1988 2003
Illiterate 22.9 11.7 11.6 4.3 33.9 18.9
No diploma 9.1 4.4 9.6 4.0 8.6 4.8
Primary 47.2 49.6 51.8 48.7 42.8 50.6
Lower secondary 8.1 9.8 10.5 12.9 5.7 6.8
Lower secondary vocational 0.7 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.1
Upper secondary 6.0 11.1 7.1 13.1 5.0 9.1
Upper secondary vocational 2.7 6.4 3.8 8.3 1.7 4.4
Tertiary 3.2 6.9 4.7 8.6 1.8 5.2
Source : SIS Labor Force database.
and institutional factors and partly explain the declining overall trend of the labor market participation.
The rapid demographic transition experienced by Turkey since the 1950s and the concomitant structural
transformations of the country resulting in a shift out agriculture have been translated into a high
ratio of rural-to-urban migration and a decline in women’s participation in the labor force. When rural
women actively working in agriculture migrate to urban areas, the fact that they are less educated than
men virtually prevents them from finding paid employment in the official labor force. In rural areas,
where agriculture dominates and labor-intensive technology is widespread, and where home and work
environment overlap to a great extent, all family members are more likely to participate in productive
activities, and most of the women and children work as unpaid family labor in agriculture. By contrast,
urban households tend to be more specialized, men earn an income while women are homemakers. Lower
female participation rates in the urban areas reflect both social custom whereby married women are
expected to devote themselves to domestic work and a greater access to education that lowers participation
among the youngest. Regional differences are also striking in the instance of female employment. In the
West of Turkey, the proportion of women working for pay is 40%, while in the East approximately 90%
of women still have the status of unpaid family workers (Ilkkaracan, 1999).
Although between 1980 and 2000 the employment rate in Turkey was continuously falling, the unem-
ployment rate did not increase. As a result, open unemployment is not particularly high, averaging 8
to 10 % during the 1990’s and the early 20003. In the same time, the informal sector has developed,
3Turkey’s unemployment figures are likely to be underestimated as workers have few incitations to report themselves
as unemployed. The unemployment insurance system was legally established in 1999 but the first benefit payments were
made in the beginning of 2002 only. Moreover, the coverage of the plan is currently very low. According to the World Bank
(2006), less than 4% of the unemployed workers are getting benefits.
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and according the the last report of the World Bank, more than half of the working population is today
working in the informal sector. In urban areas, one worker out of three has no social insurance, and in
rural areas, this proportion raises up to three persons out of four. Consequently, half of existing workers in
Turkey receive no social benefits or job protection, and this precariousness affects more often the female
workers, which are more concerned by unemployment4 and when working are more often employed in the
informal sector.
Thus, even though gender discrimination is legally prohibited 5 in Turkey, the situation of women
in the labor market appears particularly worrying. However, these descriptive statistics does not say if
the situation is due to active discrimination against women. It could be also the result of the traditional
accepted gender division in the Turkish society, or the consequence of inferior human capital characteris-
tics of women, particularly in terms of education. This is the question that we will try to clarify in the
following sections.
2.2 Structure of the Population Studied
The data used in this study is taken from the 2003 Household Budget Survey conducted by the Turkish
State Institute of Statistics (SIS). This survey uses samples representative of the whole population, chosen
in both urban and rural areas, in order to study the behavior of Turkish households. The final sample is
composed of 107,614 individuals from 25,920 households.
We confine our investigation to the working age population, that is individuals from 15 to 64, which
numbered 69,712, with 47.7% males and 52.3% females (Table 3). Among them, only 35,638 are active,
resulting in a very low labor force participation rate equal to 51.1 %. Women’s participation in the labor
market is even lower as if they count for more than half of the sample working age population, only 28.3%
are active. Therefore, the great majority of the inactive people of working age are women (76.8 %). If
we consider only what we could call the ”pure inactive” people (by excluding from the inactive those
who can not apply for a job : the individuals who are waiting to start work, the students, the sick and
disabled persons, the pensioners ...), 95.1 % are women (see Table 21 in Appendix 1). Table 3 also shows
that participation and employment rates are higher in rural than in urban areas, especially for women.
In our sample, the unemployment rate (the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed) reaches
10.1 % and is very close to the national average unemployment rate equal to 10.5% in 2003. Women are
slightly more concerned than men as the female unemployment rate is equal to 11.2% and the male’s is
9.6%.
Figure 1(b) shows clearly that the bulk of working aged women are inactive (73%). When they are
active, one women out of two is an unpaid family worker, and one out of three is a wage employee.
Compared to men, active women are far less often wage-earners, self-employed or employers (see Table
4).
If we focus on the salaried population, who represents 23.6 % of the sample working age population,
women become scarcer as they count for only 20 % of the salaried workers. This proportion is falling
to 18.5 % when we restrict to the full-time salaried workers only (those working at least 30 hours a
4According to World Bank (2006), in 2002, 24.7% of women only have access to social security, for 50.9% of men.
5Labor Law Article 26 stipulates that male and female workers performing jobs of the same nature and working with
equal efficiency will receive the same wages.
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Tab. 3 – Structure of the Population Studied
Working Age Active Employed Participation Employment
Individuals Individuals Individuals rate rate
Number Number Number Percent Percent
Total 69,712 35,638 32,056 51.1 46.0
Female 36,485 10,303 9,146 28.3 25.1
Male 33,227 25,335 22,910 76.3 69.0
Urban 48,409 21,429 18,504 44.3 37.3
Female 25,244 4,558 3,568 18.1 14.1
Male 23,165 16,871 14,936 72.8 64.5
Rural 21,303 14,209 13,552 66.7 63.6
Female 11,241 5,745 5,578 51.1 49.6
Male 10,062 8,464 7,974 84.1 79.2
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
Tab. 4 – Composition of the Labor Force
Status Wage Earners Employers Self-Employed Unpaid Family Unemployed Total
Workers
Total 16,475 (46.2 %) 1,684 (4.7 %) 6,602 (18.5%) 7,295 (20.5%) 3,582 (10.1%) 35,652
Female 3,301 (32.1%) 61 (0.6%) 883 (8.6%) 4,901 (47.5%) 1,157 (11.2%) 10,310
Male 13,174 (52.0%) 1,623 (6.4%) 5,719 (22.6%) 2,394 (9,5%) 2,425 (9.6%) 25,342
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
week.6). If in urban areas, wage and salary employees form the largest fraction of the male and female
working populations with 72.3% and 79.2% respectively, in rural areas by contrast, 42.9% of working men
are self-employed and only 29.9% of them are wage earners. Concerning women, the dominant form of
employment in rural areas is unpaid family membership with about 80% of the total, only 8.6% of rural
active women are wage-earners (see Table 24 in Appendix 1).
In the sample, women are more likely than men to be in precarious jobs, even among salary workers
(see Table 5). The proportion of salaried women with long term contracts is equal to 76.2 % compared to
85.6 % for men, 58.5% of them are registered in social security compared to 65.6% of the salaried man.
If we consider the fact of not being covered by any social insurance as a proxy of the belonging to the
informal sector7, women are proportionally more concerned.
Gender disparities in education appear clearly in the data (Table 6), and are particularly pronounced
at the lowest levels of education. In our sample, 21.6% of the working age women are illiterate or non
graduate compared to 6.4% of their male counterparts. A third only of women of working age have
achieved a level of education higher than primary school, compared to more than half for men.
The picture is quite different if we focus on the salaried population of our sample (Table 6 and
Figures 2). Salaried women happen to be strikingly more educated than their counterparts of working
age. Illiterate and non graduate women are clearly under-represented among wage earners, though the
6The legal working time in Turkey is 45 hours a week.
7See Tansel (2000). In Turkey, it is illegal for an employer to employ workers without social security coverage.
6
24%
7%
40%
5%
17%
7%
Inactive
Unemployed
Salaried
Employers
Self-employed
Unpaid workers
(a) Men of Working Age
73%
3%
9%
0%
2%
13%
Inactive
Unemployed
Salaried
Employers
Self-employed
Unpaid workers
(b) Women of Working Age
Fig. 1 – Activity Status
Tab. 5 – Type of Labor Contract
Wage-Earners Long-term Covered by social Full-time
contract insurance
Total 16,475 13,800 (83.8%) 10,574 (64.2%) 15,286 (92.8%)
Female 3,301 2,516 (76.2%) 1,930 (58.5%) 2,829 (85.7%)
Male 13,174 11,284 (85.6%) 8,644 (65.6%) 12,457 (94.6%)
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
most educated are over-represented. So, salaried employment concentrates women who are comparatively
more educated. This phenomenon does not concern men to the same extent.
Given the scarcity of women in the Turkish labor market, occupations are all dominated by men
except the skilled agricultural workers (Figure 8(a) in Appendix 1). This exception is explained by the
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Tab. 6 – Educational Attainment
% of Working Age Population % of Salaried Population
Population Men Women Population Men Women
Illiterate 8.8 2.5 14.5 2.1 1.4 4.6
No diploma 5.6 3.9 7.1 2.3 2.1 3.0
Primary 42.9 41.5 44.2 37.9 40.3 28.4
Lower secondary 16.9 19.9 14.1 14.3 15.4 9.9
Lower secondary vocational 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2
Upper secondary 16.1 19.1 13.3 20.8 20.8 21.1
Upper secondary vocational 3.1 4.4 2.0 6.3 6.3 6.4
Tertiary 6.4 8.3 4.6 15.8 13.1 26.5
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
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Fig. 2 – Distribution of Men and Women by Educational Attainment
domination of women among unpaid family workers. Indeed, if we restrict to the salaried population
only, all occupations are male-dominated (see Figure 8(b) in Appendix 1). Concerning sectors, women
dominate the agricultural sector — where are found most of the unpaid family workers — and the sector
of private households with employed persons, where domestic workers — who are mainly women — are
registered. Except for agriculture, the gender composition of sectors is very close for the working aged
and the salaried populations (see Figures 9 in Appendix 1).
Genders are differently distributed across occupations and sectors. The bulk of working women are
agricultural workers, nearly 60% against 20% of their male counterparts (Figure 3(a)). The distribution
of the female salaried population across occupations is much less concentrated — as more than half of
the salaried women is uniformly distributed across intermediary occupations (17% are professionals, 15%
clerks, 12% service and sale workers) and a quarter is elementary workers (Figure 3(b)). It is worthwhile
noticing that, in our sample, female salaried workers are more likely to be managers, professionals or
employees than their male counterparts, although the latter are more often skilled or unskilled workers.
We find here the same feature than in the Southern European countries (Spain, Greece, Italy or Portu-
gal) where the proportion of women holding managerial positions is higher than men’s (see Meurs and
Ponthieux, 2005). The main reason of this particularity is the low employment rate for women in these
countries. As women are actually fewer in employment, those holding high-status occupations are pro-
portionally in greater numbers compared to men in these countries, or to women in the other developed
countries. This trait may also be partly explained by a generation effect, older women being less likely
8
to be active, and when active, more likely to be unpaid family workers than the younger, who are more
likely to be both better educated and salaried.
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Fig. 3 – Distribution of Men and Women by Occupation
At the sector level, if working women are concentrated in agriculture, the salaried women are found
first in the manufacturing sector, followed by education and trade (see Figure 4). Interestingly, if in much
countries the public sector appears rather favorable to female workers, this does not seem to be the case
in Turkey since the public sector employs women and men in quite the same proportions than the private
one, and the distribution of men and women between these two sectors is the same (see Table 23 in
Appendix 1).
Finally, concerning differences in geographical location, 36% of the female salaried workers are concen-
trated in the Marmara region (the westerner region of the country, where Istanbul is located). A closer
examination show that among wage-earners, the proportion of women is falling when moving toward the
Eastern regions (see Figures 10). This can be related to cultural and religious differences between these
two areas, Eastern regions being more rural and less developed than the Western ones. When considering
the geographical distribution of the working population rather than the salaried one, the proportion of
women raises up, particularly in the rural regions (Black Sea, South East Anatolia, East Anatolia), what
can be linked to the number of unpaid family workers among active women (see Table 25 and Figures 5
and 10).
On the whole, we find clearly in our sample data the global characteristics of the Turkish labor market
described in the preceding section : women do not participate much in the labor market, they are on
average less educated than men, they are more often in precarious jobs and in the informal sector. Salaried
women are even scarcer — the probability to accede to the salaried employment is much lower for women
than for men — they are mainly urban, much more educated than the women’s average and form the
majority of the high educated wage earners. Compared to men, they are more likely to occupy high-status
occupations. These characteristics may indicate a high selectivity for women into salaried employment,
the process of selection setting for them higher standards in terms of educational attainment. The figures
presented so far reveal striking differences in the way men and women are distributed into employment,
across occupations and sectors, and let suspect that the mechanisms of selection into work and into
salaried work are likely to be gender specific in Turkey, the selection process being potentially tainted of
segregation. Those differences would have to be taken into account in our analysis of discrimination.
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Fig. 4 – Distribution of Men and Women by Industries
3 Observed Gender Wage Gaps in Turkey
The relative gap between the male and female average monthly wages8 computed on the full sample
of the salary workers is equal to 25 % in favor of men (Table 7). The average monthly wage differential is
much lower, 10.4%, if we restrict to the sole full-time salary workers. Those figures are not so high when
compared to the European standards. Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) compute the average gender wage
8Wages are the sum of cash earnings, bonuses and the value of income in-kind. Fringe benefits are not included in the
wage earners reported earnings.
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ratio on the salaried workers aged 25 to 55 and working at least 15 hours a week for seven European
countries and find results varying from 1.2 in Portugal to more than 1.5 in Germany, Austria, Ireland
and the United Kingdom. On our data, we obtain, for the same population, a ratio equal to 1.13 (Table
7). Then, if we stuck to this simple comparison, situation of Turkey in terms of wage equality would not
seem particularly worrying as the Turkey’s average wage gap lies in the same scope than the one observed
in the UK, the Netherlands or Germany, that is between 20 to 25%. But beyond this observation, the
crucial point is to know how much of this gap is due to discrimination.
Tab. 7 – Observed Gender Monthly Wage Gap (New Turkish Liras)
Wage Earners (15-64) Full-time Wage Earners (25-55) Full-time
Wage Earners (15-64) working at least 15 h./week Wage Earners (25-55)
Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap
(1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)]
Average 487 389.6 1.25 491.9 410.3 1.20 531.7 469.7 1.13 533.8 483.5 1.10
Median Wage 380 260 1.46 400 300 1.33 430 350 1.23 434 380 1.14
D1 180 90 1.80 200 119 1.68 220 100 2.20 223 130 1.71
D9 863.6 750 1.15 870 778 1.12 900 850 1.06 900 850 1.06
D9/D1 4.8 8.33 - 4.35 6.54 - 4.09 8.50 - 4.04 6.54 -
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
Table 7 also shows that the wage gap is not uniform throughout the distribution of wages but is clearly
higher at the bottom of the distribution where it reaches 80% for those aged 15-64 and 120% for the 25-55
working at least 15 h./week, and substantially lower at the top, where it is only of 13% for the 15-64 and
6% for the 25-55. This result remains true when we consider the full-time salary workers only. Figure
6 plots the gender gap in terms of the differences of logged gross monthly wages of respectively male
and female salaried workers working at least 15 hours a week. As can be observed, there is a decreasing
trend, and the gender gap at the various percentiles differs notably from the gap at the mean. This
evolution stands in sharp contrast to the one found for example by Albrecht et al. (2003) in the case
of Sweden, where the raw gap increases from the bottom to the top of the log wage distribution, given
rise to the well-known glass ceiling phenomenon. Here we have a decreasing trend, resembling the sticky
floor phenomenon documented for example in de la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2005) for the low educated
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Fig. 6 – Gender Wage Gap Distribution
Spanish workers9. The ratio D9/D1 reported in Table 7 also shows the high degree of inequalities in the
distribution of wages that prevails in Turkey, inequalities much more pronounced for women.
Given that the working time is typically unequal between men and women, it is likely that a part
of the observed gender monthly wage gap is explained by differences in hours worked. In our sample,
male wage earners work in average seven hours more than their female counterparts : the weekly average
working time for women is about 44 hours, and nearly 51 hours for men (Table 8). The proportion of
part-time workers10 in the salaried population is low, only 5.2%11, and women are more concerned than
men, as 10.5% of them work part-time against 3.9% for men (see Table 22 in Appendix 1). However, the
difference in working time does not come only from a part-time work effect, but also from differences in
hours worked in full-time employment as shown by table 8. As noted by Meurs and Ponthieux (2005), the
working time is strongly constrained by sector and occupational practices and most often, workers have
to conform with the norm of their activity. Given that occupations and sectors are heterogeneous in terms
of the average working time, the hourly wage rate is not appropriate to study wage inequalities. This
point is particularly important in the study of gender wage gaps as certain occupations are dominated
by women, and others by men. In order to take into account those differences in hours worked between
men and women, we will retain the monthly wage as the dependant variable in our econometric analysis
of the gender wage gap and will include the working time as one of the explicative variable.
Male and female salaried workers differ in their working time and the type of jobs they occupied. They
also differ in their human capital characteristics as education attainment or experience. The differential
in monthly wages between men and women may thus be explained by these objective differences, but
9The rationale they give to explain this phenomenon may fit quite well the case of Turkey. Insofar as Turkish women’s
careers suffer from frequent interruptions — due to social discrimination in family duties and religious beliefs — employers
may use statistical discrimination resulting in lower wages in the lower part of the wage distribution, which typically
corresponds to entry jobs in the labor market. As their job tenure expands, however, women become more reliable to
employers and their wages converge to those of men.
10The legal working time in Turkey is 45 hours a week. We consider full-time a wage-earner working 30 hours a week or
more, and part-time a wage earner working between 10 and 29 hours.
11This is low compared to the average EU part-time employment rate equal to 18.2% in 2002 according to the European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Corral and Isusi, 2003). The part-time employment
rate in Turkey is comparable with the one observed in Greece (4.5% in 2002).
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Tab. 8 – Gender Differences in Weekly Worked Hours
Wage Earners Full-time Wage Earners Full-time
(15-64) Wage Earners (15-64) (25-55) Wage Earners (25-55)
Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap Men Women Wage gap
(1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)] (1) (2) [(1)/(2)]
Average 50.9 43.8 1.2 53.0 48.6 1.09 50.4 42.1 1.20 52.4 47 1.11
Median 48 45 1.1 50 48.0 1.04 48 40 1.20 48.0 45 1.06
D1 40 20 2.00 40 36 1.11 40 20 2.00 40 35 1.14
D9 70 60 1.17 70 63 1.11 70 60 1.17 70 60 1.17
D9/D1 1.75 3.00 - 1.75 1.75 - 1.75 3 - 1.75 1.71 -
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
it may also partly result from a different evaluation by the market of identical characteristics, what is
generally referred as discrimination. These returns are not directly observable but have to be estimated.
We do so by estimating Mincer-type earnings equations.
4 Gender Wage Discrimination in Turkey
4.1 Earnings Equations Estimates
The usual approach to investigate the wage gap — the one we will follow here — has been derived
from human capital theory (Becker, 1956 ; Mincer, 1958, 1974), where an individual’s wage rate reflects
the productivity potential based on various human capital characteristics. According to Oaxaca (1973)
and Blinder (1973), any wage differential between two groups of people can therefore be decomposed
into two parts. The first is explained by differences in observable human capital endowments supposed to
reflect productivity differences and other job related variables between both group (endowment effect), the
second reflects differences in the values assigned in the labor market to women’s and men’s characteristics,
that is the price or remuneration of these endowments (remuneration effect). This latter part of the wage
differential may be interpreted as an estimate of wage discrimination.
In this line, we assume the following log-linear wage regression model :
lnW = βX ′ + u (1)
where W is the monthly wage in New Turkish Liras, X is a vector of explicative variables including
the set of usual Mincerian human capital variables augmented with working time related variables, job
attributes and firm and sector characteristics, β is a vector of unknown parameters — the returns of the
aforesaid characteristics —, and u the error term.
The detailed list of the earnings equation’s variables, as well as the reference categories chosen for
dummies are given in Appendix 2, Figure 11, and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 26. Education
is represented by dummy variables indicating different levels of education attainment. Few information
related to work experience are available in our data set. Consequently, following Mincer (1974), we
define a proxy for actual work experience as age minus the number of years of schooling completed
minus seven, the age of entry into school in Turkey. This variable measures what is called the potential
experience, where we would like to measure the actual experience. When work experience is acquired
13
without interruption after the completion of formal schooling, potential and actual experience coincide.
Potential experience is typically a reasonable proxy for the men’s actual experience since men on average
exhibit a strong attachment to the labor force. However, potential experience overstates the actual years of
work experience of women to the extent that career’s interruptions are frequent for many female workers
due to their household and childbearing activities. This problem of measurement typically creates a bias
toward finding discrimination. To better measure the effective experience — following Oaxaca (1973)
— we include the number of children born to the women as a regressor of the earnings equation as a
proxy of the cost of career’s interruptions for women. The linear children variable reflects the cost of
lost experience due to child care, including the costs from the depreciation of skills during the period
of absence from the labor force. Accordingly, we expect the estimated coefficient of the number of child
variable to have a negative sign.
One could think that this problem of measurement of female actual work experience is not so significant
in the case of Turkey, having in mind the example of Southern European countries, where typically women
once married and having children leave definitely the labor market. In fact, this is not the case in Turkey
where a very small fraction of working aged women enters the labor market. Figure ?? plots the male
and female participation rate computed on our sample data. It shows clearly that when women decide to
participate — what very few do — they stay in the labor market.
In the set of regressors related to experience, we also include tenure on the last job occupied, as
well as the square of potential experience and of job tenure in order to capture the non linearity of the
wage–experience relation.
Since we use the monthly wage as dependent variable, we include variables related to the working
time in the set of the regressors : we use the natural logarithm of the weekly worked hours and a dummy
indicating part-time employment. At last, we had as control variables, variables related to the class
of worker (dummy variables for union membership, government employed, social insurance), the type
of labor contract (dummy variables for permanent and fixed term contracts), the job occupied (dummy
variables for occupations and industries) and the geographical localization (dummy variables for residence
in rural area and for the seven big Turkish regions).
The results of the estimates are presented in Appendix 2, Figures 13 and 14. The different components
of human capital (education level, potential experience and job tenure) have a positive and significant
effect on wages for both men and women. The returns to job tenure are very close for both sexes, although
the returns to education and potential experience are higher for men at all levels. Experience squared
and job tenure squared have a negative impact on wages also for both sex, implying that wages increase
at a decreasing rate with experience and job tenure, reflecting an inverted U-shaped profile of earnings as
experience and job tenure increase. The number of worked hours has a positive impact on wages for both
men and women, but compared to men, women gain more from working more than the average. Part-time
workers receive lower wages, particularly when they are women, and wages are significantly higher in the
public sector than in the private sector. As to occupations, wages increase monotonically along the job
ladder for men. This is true also for women but this effect is significant beyond the employee category
only. Wages also increase with the firm’s size in all the regressions and with social insurance affiliation.
In fact, as we said before, this last variable may be used as a proxy of the informal sector. An individual
without social insurance has a good chance to be employed in the informal sector where the wages are
lower, for both men and women. Regional dummies are in general not significant except for Marmara
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(Istanbul) and the Central Anatolia (Ankara) where the coefficients are significant and positive, implying
that wages in these areas — where the main cities are located — are higher than elsewhere.
The average logarithm of the monthly wages computed from our sample are 5.9550 for men and
5.6126 for women. The value of the wage differential in logarithmic terms is 0.34244. The estimated
average monthly wage of the salary workers is 442 for males and 352.8 for females, that is a gender wage
gap equal to 25.2% in favor of men. We now have to find out whether these gender differences in earnings
reflect productivity enhancing characteristics such as education, or are unexplained, that is are related
to discrimination practices.
4.2 Wage decompositions
Following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) it is usual to write the average wage gap as follows :
ln
(
W¯m/W¯f
)
= X¯ ′f
(
βˆm − βˆf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination
+ βˆm
(
X¯m − X¯f
)′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowments
(2)
where W¯ denotes the geometric mean wage evaluated by the earning equation (1), X¯ are the average
characteristics and βˆ the estimated returns on these characteristics, the indices m and f denoting male
and female variables respectively. The first term of decomposition (2) represents the differences in returns
on male and female characteristics respectively, that is the discrimination component, the second one the
differences in the observed characteristics of men and women — the endowment component.
The Oaxaca-Blinder’s method has been subject to criticisms on the point that it is based on the
endowment prices of one of the two genders — the male here and in most applications — thereby intro-
ducing a potential dissymmetry in the effects depending on which gender is considered as the reference.
Actually, this problem — known as the index-problem — lies in the choice of the wage structure that
is to be regarded as the non-discriminatory standard. Indeed, and more generally, given (1), the gender
wage gap could be decomposed in the following way :
ln
(
W¯m/W¯f
)
= X¯ ′m
(
βˆm − βˆ∗
)
+ X¯ ′f
(
βˆ∗ − βˆf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination
+ βˆ∗
(
X¯m − X¯f
)′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowments
(3)
where βˆ∗ is an estimated non-discriminatory wage structure. The first two terms in (3) correspond to
the discrimination component — the first term representing pure favoritism toward males and the second
one pure discrimination against females —, the third term is the endowment component. A choice has to
be made regarding βˆ∗. Oaxaca (1973) first proposes either the current male structure βˆm (which leads to
the decomposition described in equation 2), or the current female wage structure βˆf , suggesting that the
result would bracket the ”true” non-discriminating wage structure. But other decompositions have been
proposed in the literature. Reimers (1983) assigns identical weights to both men and women. Cotton
(1988) argues that the non-discriminatory structure should approach the structure that holds for the
larger group and thus proposes using as weights the relative group sizes in the sample. A more general
method is provided by Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) who uses the wage structure
obtained by OLS estimates on the pool sample as the non-discriminatory standard.
Table 9 presents our results for four alternative decompositions (see Appendix 3, Figure 17 for confi-
dence intervals). The first (D1) and the third (D3) are the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions using
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respectively the current male and female wage structures as the non-discriminating norm, the second one
(D2) is the one proposed by Reimers using the intermediate norm and the fourth and last one (D4) is the
one proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom. The results appear clearly sensitive to the decomposition method
used.
Tab. 9 – Gender Wage Gap Decompositions∗
Full-scale Wage Regressions
Decomposition method Endowment Discrimination
D1 Oaxaca-Blinder Male 42.3% 57.7%
D2 Reimers 31.8% 68.2%
D3 Oaxaca-Blinder Female 21.3% 78.7%
D4 Oaxaca-Ransom 54.0% 46.0%
∗ All components are significant at the 5% level, see Appendix 3 for details.
Not surprisingly, the discrimination component is the highest in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
using the female wage structure as reference, as it amounts to 78.7% of the gender wage gap, against
57.7% when using the male structure. The Reimers decomposition leads to an intermediate result of 68.2%,
although the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition, that uses the pool wage structure as the non discriminatory
standard, leads to assign a lower part of the gender wage gap to discrimination as the remuneration effect
is lessened to 46%. So, the discrimination component, depending on the decomposition, ranges from 46
to 79% of the estimated gender wage gap.
None of these decompositions is better than the others, each of them referring to a peculiar vision
of discrimination. Using for example the estimated male wage structure as the norm assumes that all of
the discrimination against women is attributable to favoritism toward men, whereas using the estimated
female wage structure assumes that all of the discrimination against women is pure discrimination. It is
generally accepted that the current female wage structure is not a good choice as the non discriminatory
standard. As pointed by Oaxaca and Ransom (2003), in terms of practical application for correcting gender
wage inequities, the use of the female structure as the equity standard presents potential problems of
implementation associated with legal restrictions and employee moral. Ginther and Hayes (2003) point
out that men are the usual comparison group in legal proceedings concerning gender discrimination and
consequently cast doubts on the fact that a pooled approach, obtained from a weighted average of the
male and female wage structures as in D3 or D4, could be used in legal cases concerned with equal
opportunities for women and men. The diversity of wage gap decompositions found in the literature
makes comparisons difficult and from this point of view is regrettable. We follow Ginther and Hayes
(2003) in considering that operational choice criteria should weigh in this debate, criteria that lead to
favor the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using the male norm. But our concern here being
also comparability, and given that Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) chose to use in their study of the EU
countries the Oaxaca and Ransom methodology, we will systematically report in the following this other
measure of discrimination.
If the wage decomposition into endowment and discrimination components depends on the choice of
the non-discriminating norm, it also crucially depends on the choice of explanatory variables included in
the earning equations. Typically, the greater the number of control variables is, the smaller the remu-
neration effect will be and thus the part of the gender gap affected to discrimination (Sofer, 1995). In
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fact, when controlling by variables related to the job occupied and geographical localization, one defines
discrimination as difference in remuneration between individuals of identical characteristics occupying the
same job and living in the same area. By doing so, one neglects the fact that typically men and women
have not got the same access into jobs because of segregation phenomena and that segregation practices
may be more or less pronounced depending on occupations, sectors and regions, so the effects of these
types of barriers as sources of discrimination ar eliminated. As a result, we are likely to underestimate the
effects of discrimination when adding regressors in Mincer equation beyond the human capital variables.
One way to evaluate the scale of segregation against women is thus to estimate another set of equations
that do not control for occupation, industry, class of worker, type of labor contract and region. With
this set of regressions that we shall labeled, following Oaxaca (1973), the personal characteristics wage
regressions, we obtain the results presented in Table 10 (see Appendix 2, Figures 15 and 16 for estimation
results and Appendix 3, Figure 18 for details on decompositions).
Tab. 10 – Gender Wage Gap Decompositions∗
Personal Characteristics Wage Regressions
Decomposition method Endowment Discrimination
D1 Oaxaca-Blinder Male 22.5% 77.5%
D2 Reimers 09.4% 90.6%
D3 Oaxaca-Blinder Female -03.8% 103.8%
D4 Oaxaca-Ransom 28.4% 71.6%
∗ All components are significant at the 5% level, see Appendix 3 for details.
Actually, discrimination increases sharply as it ranges now, depending on the decomposition, from
71.6% to 103.8% (compared to the 46%-78.7% range obtained from the full-scale wage regressions).
Consequently, segregation against women is likely to be an important phenomenon in the Turkish labor
market, and an essential component of the gender labor market discrimination prevailing in this country.
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Tab. 11 – Decomposition of the Endowment Component
Casual Factor Amount Amount Amount
attributable attributable attributable
Variable to Endowments to Coefficients
Education -4.2 -6.8 8.6
Primary School 3.2 1.3 1.9
Middle School 1.9 1.0 0.9
High School 2.9 -0.2 3.1
Bachelor degree -1.2 -1.8 0.6
Over -5.0 -7.1 2.1
Experience 26.8 9.5 17.3
Experience 44.7 21.1 23.6
Experience squarred -17.9 -11.6 -6.3
Job Tenure 5.8 4.4 1.5
Tenure 8.9 8.5 0.5
Tenure squarred -3.1 -4.1 1.0
Working Time -56.3 2.7 -59.0
Hours Worked -57.2 2.1 -59.3
Part-time Work 0.9 0.6 0.3
Rural area -0.5 -0.2 -0.3
Region of residence -4.8 -1.2 -3.7
Aegean -1.0 0.0 -1.0
Mediterranean 0.0 0.0 -0.0
Marmara -3.3 -1.3 -1.9
South East Anatolia -0.1 0.1 -0.2
Central Anatolia -0.5 0.2 -0.7
Eastern Anatolia 0.1 0.1 0.1
Labor Contract Stability 2.6 1.8 0.9
Permanent 1.2 -0.5 1.8
Fixed-term 1.4 2.3 -0.9
Occupations -3.0 -2.5 -0.3
Managers, officials -3.6 -2.3 -1.2
Professionals -1.5 -1.0 -0.5
Employees -0.2 -0.2 0.1
Skilled Workers 2.3 1.0 1.3
Sectors -11.2 5.1 -16.5
Industry -0.9 0.2 -1.1
Construction 2.0 2.0 -0.0
Trade and Repair -1.5 0.1 -1.6
Hotels and Restaurants -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Transport and Communication 1.1 1.2 -0.2
Financial services, Real Estate and Business Activities -0.9 -0.4 -0.6
Public Administration, Education, Health and Social Work -5.6 1.0 -6.6
Other Services -5.0 1.0 -6.0
Public sector 1.6 0.3 1.3
Firm’s Size 1.4 -0.5 1.9
Social Insurance -7.9 1.3 -9.2
Union Membership 0.6 0.4 0.2
Number of Children 3.2 -0.2 3.4
Subtotal -39.9 E=14.5 C=-54.4
Shift Coefficient U=74.2
Total R=34.2 D=C+U=19.8
A + sign indicates an advantage for males ; a − sign an advantage for females.
A closer examination of the results obtained with the full-scale regressions enables us to say more about
the part played by each subset of variables into the average non-discriminatory endowment effect denoted
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E in Table (11) that refers to the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (D1). The E component
related to the observed wage gap denoted R in Table (11) gives the endowment component reported in
Table(9). The decomposition of the endowment effect by components presented in Table (11) reveals that
even though female salary workers have, on average, inferior endowments compared to males, this is not
true concerning education attainments since educational variables actually accounts for a 6.8% differential
in favor of women. The results of the regressions further show that this advantage in endowments is
accounted for by the average higher level of schooling of women among the highly educated salary
workers. Actually, we saw in section 2.2 that the female salary workers are in average more educated
than men at the high levels of education. Interestingly also, the distribution of female salary workers
across occupations give them an advantage in term of endowments due to the fact that, compared to
men, they are more concentrated at the top of the job ladder. By contrast, the distribution of salary
workers across industries favors men. But the main factor explaining the inferior endowments of female
salary workers is their lack of experience and job tenure. Interestingly, this disadvantage does not come
from their level of experience and tenure on job — as in terms of years of potential experience and tenure
women get the advantage —- but from the associated quadratic terms, indicating that the main advantage
for male salary workers is their more concave experience-wage and tenure-age profile. The female inferior
endowments are also explained by a lower working time and by more precarious labor contracts.
The decomposition of the discrimination term is not interpretable in the same way as shown by
Jones (1983). In fact, this latter demonstrates that the Blinder (1973) decomposition of the residual
discrimination term (D), into two components — the part due to difference in the coefficients (C) and the
part due to the difference between the intercepts (U) — is arbitrary and thus uninterpretable. Indeed, this
decomposition cannot be uniquely determined because the value for the difference in intercepts depends
on measurement decisions, in particular the choice of the omitted category for the dummy variables and
the treatment of certain variables as continuous or not. Consequently, to go further in our analysis of
discrimination in Turkey, we compute the same decompositions for different sub-populations.
Results are reported in Table (12) for the different occupations. The wage gap decreases monotonically
along the job ladder, from .743 in logarithms for the unskilled workers to .138 for the senior managers,
but it is not the case for discrimination which appears to be particularly strong at the top for the senior
managers (from 74.6% in D4 to 91.9% in D1), and at the bottom for the skilled workers (from 48.9% in
D4 to 64.6% in D1).
Tab. 12 – Wage Gap Decompositions by Occupations
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Deomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
Total of the wage-earners 0.342 42.3 57.7 54.0 46.0
Senior managers 0.138 8.1 91.9 25.4 74.6
Technicians and associate 0.202 90.9 8.1 80.4 19.6
Clerks and service Workers 0.313 65.4 34.6 70.4 29.6
Skilled workers 0.599 35.4 64.6 51.1 48.9
Unskilled workers 0.743 61.2 38.8 73.3 26.7
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We have also estimated the wages for men and women by level of educational attainment. Results are
reported in Table (13) and show that if the wage gap decreases with higher levels of education (from .668
in logarithms for the non graduate salary workers to .218 for the university graduate salary workers),
there is no clear relation between education and discrimination except that education does not protect
women against discrimination, as even for the highest levels of education (over bachelor), discrimination
still amounts to about 40% of the wage gap.
Tab. 13 – Wage Gap Decompositions by Educational Attainments
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
No education 0.668 38.0 62.0 71.2 28.2
Primary school 0.670 51.7 48.3 65.9 34.1
Middle School 0.542 70.8 29.2 75.6 24.4
High Scool 0.359 63.5 36.5 65.9 34.1
Bachelor 0.207 41.5 58.5 44.2 55.8
Over 0.218 59.1 40.9 60.8 39.2
We saw in section 2.2 that contrasts between rural and urban areas are important in Turkey concerning
the structure of the labor market. Separate estimates on the rural and urban populations show that the
urban environment is not particularly favorable to the female salary workers as, if the wage differential
is lower in the cities, discrimination is slightly higher (Table 14).
Tab. 14 – Wage Gap Decompositions by areas
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
Rural 0.588 48.1 51.9 65.4 34.6
Urban 0.311 41.4 58.6 52.1 47.9
Examination to the age factor shows that age does protect against discrimination (Table 15). If the
gender wage gap increases monotonically with age, from 0 to .71 in logarithms, the part attributed to
discrimination is the lowest for the oldest, as it lessens from more than 167% of the wage gap to 39% in
D1 and from 133.6 to 26.5% in D4. This result corroborates the possibility of statistical discrimination
against young women, employers anticipating that they will leave the labor market once married and
mothers. Consequently, when restricting to the population studies by Meurs and Ponthieux of those aged
25-55 working at least 15 hours a week, we find a wage differential equal to 0.256 in logarithms, that is
a wage gap equal to 13.2% in favor of men, and a discrimination component raising to 67.9% in D1 and
to 84% in D4.
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Tab. 15 – Wage Gap Decompositions by Age Categories
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
[15− 64] 0.342 42.3 57.7 54.0 46.0
[15− 25[ 0.00 – – – –
[25− 35[ 0.122 −67.2 167.2 −33.6 133.6
[35− 45[ 0.396 25.8 74.2 45.2 54.8
[45 and over[ 0.709 61.1 38.9 73.5 26.5
[25− 55] 0.256 16.0 84.0 32.1 67.9
Decompositions by industries show that discrimination is particularly high in the agricultural sector
and in the Public Administration, Education, Health and Social Work category, two sectors where women
are over represented. But if in the former, the wage differential is particularly high (.679 in logarithms),
in the latter it is particularly low (.112).
Tab. 16 – Wage Gap Decompositions by Industries
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
Agriculture 0.679 31.2 68.8 46.7 53.3
Industry 0.513 46.6 53.4 59.8 40.2
Construction 0.023† – – – –
Trade and Repair 0.241 50.1 41.9 63.9 36.1
Hotels and Restaurants 0.083† – – – –
Transport and Communication 0.063† – – – –
Fin. and Business activities 0.240 39.2 60.8 47.1 52.9
Public Adm, Edu. Health and Social 0.112 -8.0† 108.0 14.3† 85.7
Other services 0.518 71.4 28.6 89.0 11.0
† Non significant at the 5% level.
It is then interesting to estimate discrimination by opposing public and private sectors. The results,
given in Table 17, show that even though the wage differential is small in the public sector, discrimination
is very high as it ranges from 120 to more than 400% depending on decompositions. This result contrasts
with the one obtained on developed countries where generally12 the public sector is more favorable to
women (see Meurs and Ponthieux, 2005). As to informality, surprisingly, our results do not show the
informal sector as unfavorable to women. On the contrary, discrimination happens to be higher for the
socially insured salary workers. By contrast, the union membership lessens the discrimination component
of the gender gap.
12Denmark is an exception.
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Tab. 17 – Wage Gap Decompositions by classes of workers
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
Public 0.080 -20† 120 -337.5 437.5
Private 0.427 44.0 56 58.3 41.7
Insured 0.096 -26.0 126.0 -21.9 121.9
Not Insured 0.569 45.5 54.5 63.4 36.6
Unionized 0.107 50.5 49.5 41.1 58.9
Not Unionized 0.339 36.9 63.1 51.0 49.0
† Non significant at the 5% level.
At last, concerning regions, the decompositions shows that discrimination is higher in Eastern Turkey
(Table 18). This is not surprising as Turkey is one country seriously affected by problems resulting
from regional differences in socio-economic conditions, which are progressively worse as one moves from
West to East, particularly for women. According to Ilkkaracan (1999), Eastern Turkey can at best be
characterized as a semi-feudal, traditional, agricultural economy. The region has a multi-ethnic character
(besides Kurds and Turks, which are the largest ethnic groups, the region also includes Zaza, Azerbaijanis,
Arabs, Christians who speak Syriac language and others) and women are confronted with a variety of
customary and religious practices, which seriously limit their rights.
Tab. 18 – Wage Gap Decompositions by Regions
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Ransom
Decomposition Decomposition
Wage gap Endowments Discrimination Endowments Discrimination
(% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap) (% of wage gap)
Marmara 0.321 42.7 57.3 57.3 42.7
Aegean 0.342 45.3 54.7 55.8 44.2
Mediterranean 0.499 56.1 43.9 43.9 56.1
Black Sea 0.412 47.3 52.7 52.4 47.6
C. Anatolia 0.239 22.1 77.9 41.8 58.2
E. Anatolia 0.132† -50.0† 150 -18.1† 118.1
SE. Anatolia 0.303 26.7 73.3 42.1 57.9
† Non significant at the 5% level.
The estimates of wages presented so far are based on the hypothesis of an equal access for men and
women to salaried employment. However, as shown in section 2.2, the probability to belong to the salaried
population differs for men and women since women are clearly under represented among salary workers.
The process of selection into wage-earning jobs probably differs also since only the most skilled women
are found there, what is not the case for men. Thus, it seems hard to consider the male and female salary
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populations as random samples of the male and female working age populations. Consequently, selection
may be a problem resulting in biased estimates of wages and as a result of wage discrimination. That
is why we propose in the next section to reestimate the wage equations using the Heckman two-steps
procedure in order to correct for potential selectivity bias.
5 Selection into salaried employment
Selectivity bias is a problem that arises when the sample used is not randomly selected. In our case,
the wages we observe are the wages of individuals who chose to work as wage-earners — a decision based
on several factors, some of which might affect the wage itself. Consequently, the coefficients obtained in
the preceding simple regressions may capture not only the effect of the dependent variables on the wage,
but also their effect on the participation decision into salaried employment. Selectivity bias might be
found at different stages of the employment process : at the stage of joining the employed labor force or
when an employment status is chosen. To solve the potential selectivity problem we follow Meurs and
Ponthieux (2005) and introduce a selection equation referring to the decision of being a salaried worker
rather than remaining inactive. We saw in the first section that in our sample, economically inactive
people are mainly women. Among the population of working age from which are excluded those who
can not find a job, those who are not in position to apply for a job (students, old age pensioners, etc),
and those who are not available for a salary job, that is the employers, the self-employed and the unpaid
family workers, 95.3% of the men are salaried workers, compared with only 15.4% of women.
The selectivity correction consists in estimating via a Probit model a latent variable that is a function
of individuals’ characteristics and expresses their propensity to hold a salaried job rather than being
purely inactive. This estimation provides us with an additional regressor (the inverse Mills ratio - IMR)
to introduce into the earning equation. This variable enables us to capture the effect on wages of selection
into the salaried employment. With a standard earning equation, we therefore have a model of the
following form :
LnW = βX ′ + θλ′ + u
where λ is an estimator of the inverse Mills ratio and θ is the coefficient indicating the effect of selection
on the wage.
To identify the participation into salaried employment, we use individual characteristics (age13, age
squared, marital status and a dummy for polygamy14), households’ demographics (having children, ha-
ving children aged between 0 and 6 years, number of children, size of the household) and household’s
wealth indicators (housing owner, logarithm of household’s incomes other than wages) as instruments
(see Appendix 4, Figure 19 for a detailed list of the regressors used in the selection equation). These
variables are expected to have a direct impact on occupational choice but no direct impact on the actual
wage earned. Results of the estimates are presented in Appendix 4, Figures 20 and 21.
Age and age squared have the expected positive and negative signs respectively. The coefficients are
significant in all specifications implying that the probability of working as a salary worker increases with
13The idea here is that what matters for wages is how many years one is in the labor market as for the probability of
entrance into salaried employment, age might be more relevant than work experience because of potential discrimination
at the entrance level against very young or old applicants or cohort effect that might be at work.
14372 households in our sample are polygamous.
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age but at a decreasing rate, reflecting an inverted U-shaped profile with age. High levels of education
increase the probability of being a salary worker rather than being inactive for both men and women. For
women, a level of education higher than the primary school strongly increases the probability of being a
wage earner.
The marital status has an important impact on the participation in the salaried employment but differs
with gender as the coefficient of the variable ”married” is significantly positive for men and significantly
negative for women. Married men are more likely to work than their unmarried counterparts, which could
be explained by the fact that men are typically the main wage earner in the family. On the contrary,
married women are less likely to be salaried-worker than their unmarried counter-parts and than men.
This probably reflects a higher reservation wage for married women resulting for access to their spouses’
income, and also because of difficulties of coping with wage employment owing to the burden of their
domestic responsibilities and of traditions. As to the polygamy variable, it does not significant affect the
participation decision into salaried employment.
While the coefficient of the household’s size is significant and negative for both sexes, the number of
children has a significant positive impact on the probability of being a wage-earner, but the presence of
small children has a negative impact on women’s participation, while it is not significant for men. These
results corroborate the interpretation as men being the main wage earner for the household and women
having to care for children.
At last, the variable ”housing owner” appears to be significant and negative in all the regressions, being
owner of one’s housing reduces the probability to be a salaried worker rather than inactive. The variable
”household’s other incomes” play a distinctive role for men and women as its coefficient is significantly
positive for women but negative for men.
Once wage estimates corrected for selectivity bias, we compute the Oaxaca-Blinder’s type decompo-
sitions on the corrected wage gap. The difference between the two gaps (without and with selectivity
correction) may be interpreted as the part of the observed wage gap due to selectivity. Neuwman and
Oaxaca [1998] discuss the question of the affectation of the selectivity term to the explained and unex-
plained components. We choose here to treat selectivity as a separate component. This is the simplest
approach, as it requires no a priori hypotheses about whether selectivity has more influence on individual
characteristics or on the returns on theses characteristics. We then obtain an equation of the following
form :
ln
(
W¯m/W¯f
)
= X¯ ′m
(
βˆm − βˆ∗
)
+ X¯ ′f
(
βˆ∗ − βˆf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discrimination
+ βˆ∗
(
X¯m − X¯f
)′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowments
−
(
θˆmλˆm − θˆf λˆf
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selectivity
(4)
where βˆ∗ is the non-discriminating norm.
Results are presented in Table (19) (see Figure 22 in Appendix 4 for confidence intervals). Selection
contributes to slightly reduce the gender wage gap as it now amounts in logarithms to .334 compared to
.342 without selectivity correction. For both men and women, the coefficient of the IMR is negative and
significant. As the IMR is negatively related to the probability to participate into salaried employment,
these results show that for both genders, those who are the more likely to be wage-earners are also the
more likely to earn high wages. So, the individuals actually employed as salaried workers are the higher
earning potential ones when compared with the reference population, and this is particularly true for men
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Tab. 19 – Selectivity-Corrected Gender Wage Gap Decompositions∗
Decomposition method Endowment Discrimination Selectivity
D1 Oaxaca-Blinder Male 31.8% 65.7% 2.5%
D2 Reimers 28.8% 68.7% 2.5%
D3 Oaxaca-Blinder Female 25.8% 71.7% 2.5%
D4 Oaxaca-Ransom 47.0% 50.5% 2.5%
∗ All components are significant at the 5% level, see Appendix 3 for details.
as the λ’s coefficient is higher for men than for women. The estimated average logarithm of the monthly
wages are now 6.030 for men, and 5.696 for women. The corresponding average monthly wages amount
to 467.44 New Turkish Liras for males and 375.26 for females, leading to a gender wage gap of 24,6% in
favor of men.
If the wage gap decreases slightly after the selectivity correction (the selectivity component amounting
to 2.5% of the total wage gap), its unexplained part — that is the discrimination component — increases
in all decompositions except (D3). It amounts now to 65.7% compared to 57.7 without correction with
the standard Oaxaca decomposition (D1), and to 50.5% compared to 46% with the Oaxaca-Ransom
decomposition. So, once controlled for gender differences in the probability to participate in salaried
employment, discrimination increases.
6 Comparison with some EU countries
This comparison is based on the work of Meurs and Ponthieux (2005). In their study of wage discrimi-
nation in the EU countries, Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) consider only the wage-earners aged 25-55 and
working at least 15 hours a week. Moreover, as regards the issue of selection, they choose to implement
the selectivity correction on the female population only, setting λˆm = 0 in the Heckman’s procedure,
considering that the problem of selection between salaried employment and inactivity concerns mainly
women. In order to obtain results strictly comparable with theirs, we choose to restrict to the same
population and to follow the same methodology for the selectivity correction. Actually, when doing so,
selectivity correction is not needed anymore as the λ’s coefficient is no more significant for the female
population (see Figure 24 in Appendix 5). For the population considered, we obtain a gender wage gap in
logarithm terms equal to .256, and according to the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition, 67.1% of this wage
differential is related to discrimination (see Appendix 5, Figure 23 for details).
Methodologically perfectly comparable, our results and those of Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) are
presented in Table 20. We are now able to situate Turkey relatively to the EU countries in terms of
gender wage discrimination.
If we rank Turkey in terms of increasing total wage gap, Turkey comes at the fifth position on
eleven, after Portugal, Denmark, Italy and Greece, and before France, Spain, Austria, Ireland, UK and
Germany. If we consider only the percentage of the discrimination part in the total gender wage gap,
that is if countries are classified in terms of increasing wage discrimination, the ranking is not the same
as Turkey happens to come in ninth position, before Greece and Portugal (Figure 7).
This comparison reveals that Turkey is not doing so bad compared to other European countries
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Tab. 20 – Gender Wage Gap by Country
Country Discrimination Endowments Selection Total Wage Gap
% of Total Wage Gap % of Total Wage Gap % of Total Wage Gap in logarithm
Germany 45.5 44.9 09.6 0.470
Austria 41.0 62.8 -03.8 0.449
Denmark 26.2 74.3 0.00 0.202
Spain 62.0 34.5 03.5 0.287
France 27.8 41.0 31.2 0.267
Greece 88.8 21.0 -09.9 0.233
Ireland 50.8 57.7 -08.5 0.451
Italy 58.3 18.4 23.3 0.206
Portugal 117.4 -14.5 -02.9 0.172
U-Kingdom 39.0 61.6 -00.6 0.464
Average 51.3 45.6 03.1 0.320
Turkey 67.1 32.9 00.0 0.256
Source : Meurs and Ponthieux (2005) except for Turkey
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Fig. 7 – Comparison Turkey/EU
in terms of gender wage discrimination, in particular compared to the Southern ones. Perhaps should
we rather say that Turkey is not doing worse than the Southern European countries. But as regard
equal opportunities for men and women in Turkey, wage discrimination is surely only the visible part
of the iceberg. In fact, segregation and exclusion of women from the labor market are probably much
more important. As noted by Meurs and Ponthieux in their analysis of European countries, a high
discrimination component is generally not associated with an important gender wage gap. This feature
seems to be confirmed here, as in Turkey, if the gender wage gap is quite moderate, the part due to
discrimination is quite high. What our analysis seems to confirm is that wage discrimination is on average
relatively moderate in countries where selectivity into work is high for women. Moreover, the analysis
reveals that discrimination in Turkey concerns mainly the low wages, revealing a phenomenon of sticky
floor, although the glass ceiling phenomenon seems to be very limited, probably because of the high
selectivity for high educated women. Moderate wage discrimination and high selectivity go probably on
pare and it is likely that wage discrimination increases when the access for women in the Turkish labor
market gets larger.
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Appendix 1. The Turkish Labor Market and Women
Tab. 21 – Composition of the Inactive People
Inactive Pure Inactive
Total 34,074 22,538
Female 26 182 21,434
Male 7,892 1,104
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
Tab. 22 – Composition of the Salaried Population
Salaried Full-Time Part-Time
Total 16,475 15,286 857
Female 3,301 2,829 345
% 20.0 18.5 40.3
Male 13,174 12,457 512
% 81.0 81.5 59.7
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
Tab. 23 – Distribution of Men and Women in Public and Private Sectors
Private Public
Total 11,754 4,721
Female 2,395 (72.5%) 906 (27.5%)
% 20.4 19.2
Male 9,359 (71.0%) 3,815 (29.0%)
% 79.6 80.8
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
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Tab. 24 – Employment Composition of the Active Population by Gender and Area (%)
Urban Rural
Employment Status Men Women Men Women
Salaried workers 72.3 79.2 29.9 8.6
Employers 8.7 1.3 4.1 0.2
Self-Employed 15.4 7.6 42.9 11.0
Unpaid Family Workers 3.7 11.9 23.1 80.2
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
Tab. 25 – Distribution of Men and Women Across Regions (%)
Region Wage-Earners Labor Force
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Marmara 4,929 3,743 1,186 7,381 5,537 1,844
Aegean 2,423 1,828 595 4,694 3,267 1,427
Mediterranean 2,156 1,698 458 4,092 2,984 1,108
Black Sea 1,806 1,474 332 5,554 3,314 2,240
Central Anatolia 2,723 2,275 448 4,687 3,644 1,043
East Anatolia 1,004 876 128 2,242 1,654 588
South East Anatolia 1,434 1,280 154 3,4 06 2,510 896
Total 16,475 13174 3,301 32,070 22,917 9,153
Source : HBS Turkey 2006, (SIS Turkey).
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Appendix 2. Mincer Equations Estimates
Tab. 26 – Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variables Salaried Workers 15-64
Women Men
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Monthly wage 389.6 392.0 487.1 418.7
Age 31.4 9.8 35.3 9.8
Age squarred
Experience 15.3 11.4 20.2 10.7
Experience squarred
Job tenure 5.5 6.3 8.1 7.5
Job tenure squarred
Education Attainement
– Illiterate or Non Graduate 7.6% 3.5%
– Primary school 28.4% 40.3%
– Middle school 10.1% 16%
– High school 27.5% 27%
– Bachelor’s degree 6.9% 3.2%
– Over Bachelor’s degree 19.6% 9.9%
Married 55% 81.4%
Number of children 2.0% 2.2%
Having Children 88.2% 91.9%
Having Children aged less than 6 19.4% 36.5%
Size of the Household 4.2 1.7 4.6 1.9
Household’s other incomes 76.6 1118 218.2 2680.8
Housing Owner 59.7% 60.5%
Weekly worked hours 43.8 15.8 50.9 15.3
Part-time work 10.0% 13.9%
Public sector 27.5% 29%
Permanent contract 10.1% 6.3%
Fixed-term contract 76.2% 85.7%
Other contract 13.7% 8.1%
Occupation
– Senior Officials and Managers 18.9% 12.1%
– Professionals 11.4% 6.3%
– Service Workers and Sale Workers 27.3% 23.7%
– Craft Workers and Skilled Workers 12% 26.7%
– Unskilled Workers 30.4% 31.2%
Economic Branch
– Agriculture 10% 3.1%
– Industry 25.5% 28.2%
– Construction 0.5% 11.9%
– Trade and Repair 11.2% 13.8%
– Hotels and Restaurants 2.3% 5.8%
– Transport and Communication 2.3% 7.7%
– Financial services, Real Estate 6.8% 3.6%
and Business Activities
– Public Administration, Education 28.6% 20.3%
Health and Social Work
– Other community, social 12.9% 5.7%
and personal services
Size of the firm
Very small 75.2% 63.5%
Small 9.5% 12.9%
Middle 4.4% 6.3%
Bif 11.0% 17.4%
Unionized Workers 8.2% 12.0%
Social Insurance 58.5% 65.6%
Regions
– Maramara 35.9% 28.4%
– Aegean 18.0% 13.9%
– Mediterranean 13.9% 12.9%
– Central Anatolia 13.6% 17.3%
– South East Anatolia 4.7% 9.7%
– Eastern Anatolia 3.9% 6.7%
– Black Sea 10.1% 11.2%
Village 14.5% 18.1%
Istanbul 17.6% 13.5%
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Variables  
related  
to human capital 
• Experience (exp) 
• Experience
2
 (exp2) 
• Job Tenure  (tenure) 
• Job Tenure
 2
 (tenure2) 
• Diplomas  
o Illiterate or No schooling (E0) 
o Primary school (E1) 
o Middle-School (E2) 
o High-School (E3) 
o 2 years university (E4) 
o >2  years university (E5) 
• Number of children (nbchild) 
Variables  
related  
to working time  
• Log of  Weekly Worked Hours (lhours) 
• Part-time work (parttime) 
 
Variables  
related  
to the job  
• Private sector / Public sector (public) 
• Permanent contract (cdi) 
• Fixed-Term contract (cdd) 
• Others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
related 
to firm and  
activity sector 
• Socioprofessional Categories 
o Senior officials and managers (M) 
o Professionals (P) 
o Service workers and shop and market sale workers (E) 
o Craft workers and skilled workers (SW) 
o Unskilled workers (UW) 
• Industrial sectors  
o Agriculture, Hunting and Fishing (S1) 
o Industry  (S2) 
o Construction (S3) 
o Trade and Repair (S4) 
o Hotels and Restaurants (S5) 
o Transport and Communication  (S6) 
o Financial intermediation, Real Estate, Renting and 
Business activities (S7) 
o Public Administration, Education, Health and Social 
Work  (S8) 
o Other community, social and personnal services (S9) 
• Firm’s size  (firmsize) 
• Unionized worker (union) 
• Covered by social insurance (insurance) 
 
 
 
 
Variables  
related to  
geoagraphic localisation 
 
• Regions 
o Marmara (marmara) 
o Aegean (ege) 
o Mediterranean (mediterranee) 
o Central Anatolia (anatolice~e) 
o Southeast Anatolia (anatoli~dest) 
o Eastern Anatolia (anatol~est) 
o Black Sea (mernoire) 
• Village (village)/ (City) 
 
 
In red are indicated the reference situations 
 
 
Fig. 11 – Exogenous Variables In The Earning Equations
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Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   16475 
                                                       F( 38, 16436) =  602.26 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6013 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .4682 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  logsalaire |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          E1 |   .1312665   .0242281     5.42   0.000     .0837768    .1787563 
          E2 |    .176131   .0260491     6.76   0.000      .125072    .2271901 
          E3 |   .3889842   .0263292    14.77   0.000     .3373761    .4405922 
          E4 |    .531969   .0315726    16.85   0.000     .4700833    .5938548 
          E5 |   .7610775   .0336717    22.60   0.000     .6950773    .8270776 
         exp |   .0370381    .001468    25.23   0.000     .0341607    .0399155 
        exp2 |  -.0006348   .0000324   -19.58   0.000    -.0006984   -.0005712 
      tenure |   .0336924   .0018691    18.03   0.000     .0300288    .0373559 
     tenure2 |  -.0008363   .0000711   -11.76   0.000    -.0009757   -.0006969 
     nbchild |  -.0094662   .0028038    -3.38   0.001    -.0149619   -.0039705 
      lhours |   .1557909   .0137218    11.35   0.000     .1288947    .1826872 
    parttime |    -.10855   .0278742    -3.89   0.000    -.1631865   -.0539135 
      public |   .2062119   .0149402    13.80   0.000     .1769274    .2354964 
         cdd |   .0875898   .0251596     3.48   0.001     .0382743    .1369053 
         cdi |   .2590506   .0243396    10.64   0.000     .2113423    .3067588 
           M |   .3506175   .0220178    15.92   0.000     .3074602    .3937749 
           P |   .2152744   .0177376    12.14   0.000     .1805068    .2500421 
           E |   .0638337   .0113699     5.61   0.000     .0415474    .0861199 
          SW |    .055796   .0109268     5.11   0.000     .0343782    .0772138 
          S2 |   .1343202   .0317273     4.23   0.000     .0721312    .1965091 
          S3 |   .3167293   .0294078    10.77   0.000     .2590868    .3743718 
          S4 |    .128769   .0324157     3.97   0.000     .0652308    .1923073 
          S5 |    .094402   .0347633     2.72   0.007     .0262621    .1625419 
          S6 |   .3242189   .0327913     9.89   0.000     .2599444    .3884934 
          S7 |     .19401   .0360161     5.39   0.000     .1234146    .2646055 
          S8 |  -.0105638   .0321782    -0.33   0.743    -.0736366    .0525089 
          S9 |    .022371   .0325799     0.69   0.492    -.0414892    .0862311 
    firmsize |   .0669473   .0037621    17.80   0.000     .0595733    .0743214 
       union |   .1083564   .0110462     9.81   0.000     .0867048    .1300081 
        secu |   .2151399   .0107205    20.07   0.000     .1941266    .2361533 
     village |  -.0531613   .0104284    -5.10   0.000    -.0736021   -.0327205 
         ege |  -.0030269    .014376    -0.21   0.833    -.0312054    .0251517 
mediterranee |  -.0223162   .0145345    -1.54   0.125    -.0508054     .006173 
     marmara |   .1879814   .0127853    14.70   0.000     .1629208    .2130419 
   anatolySE |   .0273858   .0162888     1.68   0.093    -.0045419    .0593136 
    anatolyC |   .0600886   .0134645     4.46   0.000     .0336968    .0864805 
    anatolyE |   .0233374    .017046     1.37   0.171    -.0100747    .0567494 
        male |   .1973658   .0108259    18.23   0.000     .1761459    .2185857 
       _cons |   3.446293   .0636975    54.10   0.000     3.321439    3.571147 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Measures of Fit for regress of logsalaire 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -18429.319     Log-Lik Full Model:       -10855.409 
D(16436):                  21710.817     LR(38):                    15147.821 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
R2:                            0.601     Adjusted R2:                   0.600 
AIC:                           1.323     AIC*n:                     21788.817 
BIC:                     -137876.158     BIC':                     -14778.856 
 
Fig. 12 – Earning Equation Estimate, Full-Scale Regression, Wage-Earners aged 15-64.
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Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   13174 
                                                       F( 37, 13136) =  456.59 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5684 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .44902 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  logsalaire |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          E1 |   .1090504    .026061     4.18   0.000     .0579672    .1601337 
          E2 |   .1627518   .0279517     5.82   0.000     .1079625    .2175411 
          E3 |   .3775763    .028221    13.38   0.000     .3222592    .4328935 
          E4 |   .5009204   .0354193    14.14   0.000     .4314934    .5703474 
          E5 |   .7284843   .0374474    19.45   0.000     .6550819    .8018867 
         exp |   .0435208   .0016866    25.80   0.000     .0402148    .0468269 
        exp2 |   -.000742   .0000366   -20.27   0.000    -.0008138   -.0006703 
      tenure |   .0325497   .0020167    16.14   0.000     .0285967    .0365027 
     tenure2 |   -.000788   .0000768   -10.27   0.000    -.0009384   -.0006375 
     nbchild |  -.0091845   .0029751    -3.09   0.002    -.0150161    -.003353 
      lhours |   .1127846   .0147925     7.62   0.000     .0837891    .1417801 
    parttime |  -.0914672   .0327471    -2.79   0.005    -.1556563   -.0272781 
      public |   .2197843   .0162022    13.57   0.000     .1880256    .2515431 
         cdd |   .1318253   .0260706     5.06   0.000     .0807232    .1829275 
         cdi |   .2402282   .0259755     9.25   0.000     .1893124    .2911441 
           M |   .3421979   .0248237    13.79   0.000       .29354    .3908559 
           P |   .1946882   .0202154     9.63   0.000     .1550632    .2343133 
           E |   .0623374   .0121569     5.13   0.000     .0385081    .0861667 
          SW |   .0674265    .011237     6.00   0.000     .0454004    .0894525 
          S2 |   .0697605   .0345574     2.02   0.044      .002023     .137498 
          S3 |   .1801026   .0328418     5.48   0.000      .115728    .2444772 
          S4 |   .0411646   .0355806     1.16   0.247    -.0285786    .1109078 
          S5 |   .0092989   .0379223     0.25   0.806    -.0650343     .083632 
          S6 |   .2325589   .0358116     6.49   0.000      .162363    .3027548 
          S7 |   .1155924   .0406406     2.84   0.004     .0359309     .195254 
          S8 |  -.1260882   .0356355    -3.54   0.000    -.1959389   -.0562375 
          S9 |  -.1350654   .0375295    -3.60   0.000    -.2086287   -.0615021 
    firmsize |   .0675774   .0040958    16.50   0.000      .059549    .0756057 
       union |    .108517   .0120404     9.01   0.000     .0849161    .1321179 
        secu |   .1829495   .0115999    15.77   0.000      .160212     .205687 
     village |  -.0560333    .011025    -5.08   0.000     -.077644   -.0344226 
         ege |  -.0061573   .0155642    -0.40   0.692    -.0366653    .0243507 
mediterranee |   -.017411   .0157157    -1.11   0.268    -.0482161    .0133941 
     marmara |   .1793534   .0137918    13.00   0.000     .1523195    .2063872 
   anatolySE |   .0149672   .0169431     0.88   0.377    -.0182436    .0481781 
    anatolyC |   .0540542   .0142851     3.78   0.000     .0260534     .082055 
    anatolyE |   .0268652   .0182782     1.47   0.142    -.0089628    .0626931 
       _cons |   3.882522   .0736491    52.72   0.000     3.738159    4.026885 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Measures of Fit for regress of logsalaire 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -13660.915     Log-Lik Full Model:        -8125.666 
D(13136):                  16251.331     LR(37):                    11070.499 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
R2:                            0.568     Adjusted R2:                   0.567 
AIC:                           1.239     AIC*n:                     16327.331 
BIC:                     -108356.771     BIC':                     -10719.517 
 
Fig. 13 – Earning Equation Estimate, Full-Scale Regression, Male Wage-Earners aged 15-64.
35
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3301 
                                                       F( 37,  3263) =  195.45 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6761 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .50703 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  logsalaire |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          E1 |   .0418248   .0518627     0.81   0.420     -.059862    .1435115 
          E2 |   .0696075    .060282     1.15   0.248    -.0485869    .1878019 
          E3 |   .2664651   .0617372     4.32   0.000     .1454175    .3875127 
          E4 |     .41615   .0687333     6.05   0.000     .2813852    .5509148 
          E5 |   .6237179   .0744102     8.38   0.000     .4778225    .7696132 
         exp |    .028129   .0030487     9.23   0.000     .0221515    .0341066 
        exp2 |  -.0005691   .0000722    -7.88   0.000    -.0007107   -.0004274 
      tenure |   .0317287   .0045996     6.90   0.000     .0227104     .040747 
     tenure2 |  -.0009282   .0001815    -5.11   0.000     -.001284   -.0005724 
     nbchild |    -.02645   .0073622    -3.59   0.000     -.040885    -.012015 
      lhours |   .2740871   .0293592     9.34   0.000     .2165228    .3316514 
    parttime |  -.1156417   .0458798    -2.52   0.012    -.2055979   -.0256856 
      public |   .1739693   .0371074     4.69   0.000     .1012131    .2467255 
         cdd |  -.0421877   .0561837    -0.75   0.453    -.1523465    .0679711 
         cdi |   .2519059   .0606088     4.16   0.000     .1330708     .370741 
           M |   .4080657   .0499845     8.16   0.000     .3100616    .5060699 
           P |   .2375203   .0415966     5.71   0.000     .1559621    .3190784 
           E |   .0601371   .0321116     1.87   0.061    -.0028237     .123098 
          SW |   -.040307   .0350957    -1.15   0.251    -.1091188    .0285048 
          S2 |   .1141307   .0662947     1.72   0.085    -.0158527    .2441141 
          S3 |   .2132357   .1140522     1.87   0.062    -.0103854    .4368567 
          S4 |   .1856814   .0698163     2.66   0.008     .0487932    .3225696 
          S5 |   .1827179    .083702     2.18   0.029     .0186041    .3468316 
          S6 |   .3125059   .0822274     3.80   0.000     .1512833    .4737285 
          S7 |   .1996488   .0732563     2.73   0.006     .0560158    .3432818 
          S8 |   .1062526   .0698345     1.52   0.128    -.0306713    .2431766 
          S9 |   .3262866   .0586272     5.57   0.000     .2113368    .4412365 
    firmsize |   .0596025   .0090291     6.60   0.000     .0418992    .0773059 
       union |   .0847811   .0253723     3.34   0.001     .0350339    .1345284 
        secu |    .340213   .0266221    12.78   0.000     .2880154    .3924107 
     village |  -.0336677   .0284047    -1.19   0.236    -.0893606    .0220252 
         ege |   .0517011   .0326747     1.58   0.114    -.0123638     .115766 
mediterranee |  -.0173885   .0347324    -0.50   0.617     -.085488     .050711 
     marmara |   .2331075   .0304645     7.65   0.000      .173376     .292839 
   anatolySE |   .0499093   .0546629     0.91   0.361    -.0572679    .1570864 
    anatolyC |    .108832    .034636     3.14   0.002     .0409215    .1767425 
    anatolyE |   .0135973   .0432457     0.31   0.753    -.0711942    .0983888 
       _cons |   3.140584   .1324463    23.71   0.000     2.880898    3.400271 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Measures of Fit for regress of logsalaire 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:    -4283.387     Log-Lik Full Model:        -2422.804 
D(3263):                    4845.609     LR(37):                     3721.165 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
R2:                            0.676     Adjusted R2:                   0.672 
AIC:                           1.491     AIC*n:                      4921.609 
BIC:                      -21591.155     BIC':                      -3421.391 
 
Fig. 14 – Earning Equation Estimate, Full-Scale Regression, Female Wage-Earners aged 15-64.
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Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   13174 
                                                       F( 18, 13155) =  629.04 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4601 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .50185 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  logsalaire |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          E1 |    .215958    .028667     7.53   0.000     .1597666    .2721494 
          E2 |    .367042   .0305149    12.03   0.000     .3072284    .4268556 
          E3 |   .7055157   .0302722    23.31   0.000      .646178    .7648535 
          E4 |   .9606563     .03604    26.66   0.000     .8900128      1.0313 
          E5 |   1.280232   .0337067    37.98   0.000     1.214162    1.346302 
         exp |   .0579563    .001787    32.43   0.000     .0544536    .0614591 
        exp2 |  -.0010167   .0000385   -26.43   0.000    -.0010921   -.0009413 
      tenure |   .0451675   .0021872    20.65   0.000     .0408803    .0494546 
     tenure2 |  -.0010366   .0000858   -12.08   0.000    -.0012048   -.0008684 
     nbchild |  -.0202443    .003263    -6.20   0.000    -.0266402   -.0138483 
      lhours |   .1402862   .0143242     9.79   0.000     .1122087    .1683636 
     village |  -.1066567   .0122315    -8.72   0.000    -.1306322   -.0826812 
         ege |  -.0068198   .0179811    -0.38   0.704    -.0420653    .0284257 
mediterranee |  -.0608255   .0185225    -3.28   0.001    -.0971324   -.0245187 
     marmara |   .1752142   .0157754    11.11   0.000     .1442922    .2061362 
   anatolySE |  -.0267922   .0195762    -1.37   0.171    -.0651643    .0115799 
    anatolyC |    .034158   .0165367     2.07   0.039     .0017436    .0665723 
    anatolyE |   .0257396   .0216699     1.19   0.235    -.0167364    .0682157 
       _cons |    4.05638   .0671629    60.40   0.000     3.924731    4.188029 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Measures of Fit for regress of logsalaire 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -13660.915     Log-Lik Full Model:        -9600.651 
D(13155):                  19201.303     LR(18):                     8120.527 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
R2:                            0.460     Adjusted R2:                   0.459 
AIC:                           1.460     AIC*n:                     19239.303 
BIC:                     -105587.033     BIC':                      -7949.779 
Fig. 15 – Earning Equation Estimate, Personal Characteristics Regression, Male Wage-Earners aged
15-64.
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Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    3301 
                                                       F( 18,  3282) =  277.81 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5817 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .57448 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  logsalaire |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          E1 |   .1059605   .0567952     1.87   0.062    -.0053971    .2173182 
          E2 |   .3021639   .0651156     4.64   0.000     .1744925    .4298353 
          E3 |   .7577755   .0629442    12.04   0.000     .6343616    .8811894 
          E4 |   1.155022   .0688766    16.77   0.000     1.019977    1.290067 
          E5 |   1.475409   .0664688    22.20   0.000     1.345085    1.605734 
         exp |   .0379721   .0033007    11.50   0.000     .0315004    .0444438 
        exp2 |  -.0008544   .0000776   -11.02   0.000    -.0010064   -.0007023 
      tenure |   .0507899   .0053965     9.41   0.000      .040209    .0613708 
     tenure2 |  -.0014173    .000231    -6.14   0.000    -.0018702   -.0009644 
     nbchild |  -.0436018   .0082688    -5.27   0.000    -.0598143   -.0273894 
      lhours |   .3548124   .0264232    13.43   0.000     .3030048      .40662 
     village |  -.1405647   .0337397    -4.17   0.000    -.2067177   -.0744117 
         ege |   .0777932   .0389581     2.00   0.046     .0014086    .1541777 
mediterranee |   -.044923    .041131    -1.09   0.275     -.125568    .0357221 
     marmara |   .2745245    .035153     7.81   0.000     .2056004    .3434487 
   anatolySE |   .0304949   .0631162     0.48   0.629    -.0932561    .1542459 
    anatolyC |   .1153154   .0398586     2.89   0.004     .0371651    .1934657 
    anatolyE |   .0832809   .0529552     1.57   0.116    -.0205477    .1871095 
       _cons |   3.198495   .1236297    25.87   0.000     2.956096    3.440894 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Measures of Fit for regress of logsalaire 
 
Log-Lik Intercept Only:    -4283.387     Log-Lik Full Model:        -2844.688 
D(3282):                    5689.377     LR(18):                     2877.397 
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000 
R2:                            0.582     Adjusted R2:                   0.579 
AIC:                           1.735     AIC*n:                      5727.377 
BIC:                      -20901.324     BIC':                      -2731.561 
 
Fig. 16 – Earning Equation Estimate, Personal Characteristics Regression, Female Wage-Earners aged
15-64.
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Appendix 3. Gender Wage Gap Decomposition
                        Mean prediction Male Wage in logarithms    =  5.955023 
                        Mean prediction Female Wage in logarithms  =  5.612583 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Wage Gap   |     .34244   .0165846    20.65   0.000     .3099347    .3749452 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D1 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |   .1447199   .0131688    10.99   0.000     .1189096    .1705303 
 unexplained |     .19772   .0123435    16.02   0.000     .1735272    .2219128 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D2 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |    .108819   .0150376     7.24   0.000     .0793458    .1382921 
 unexplained |    .233621   .0125248    18.65   0.000     .2090728    .2581692 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D3 Reimers   | 
   explained |    .072918    .020603     3.54   0.000     .0325367    .1132992 
 unexplained |    .269522   .0175221    15.38   0.000     .2351793    .3038647 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D4  OR       | 
   explained |    .185046   .0134974    13.71   0.000     .1585914    .2115005 
 unexplained |    .157394   .0089517    17.58   0.000      .139849     .174939 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Fig. 17 – Gender Wage Gap Decompositions, Full-Scale Regressions
                        Mean prediction Male Wage in logarithms    =  5.955023 
                        Mean prediction Female Wage in logarithms  =  5.612583 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Wage Gap   |     .34244   .0165632    20.67   0.000     .3099766    .3749033 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D1  Oaxaca   | 
   explained |   .0769669   .0112028     6.87   0.000     .0550098    .0989239 
 unexplained |   .2654731   .0129502    20.50   0.000     .2400913    .2908549 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D2  Oaxaca   | 
   explained |   .0319788   .0126623     2.53   0.012     .0071611    .0567966 
 unexplained |   .3104611   .0128756    24.11   0.000     .2852255    .3356968 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D3  Reimers  | 
   explained |  -.0130092   .0166624    -0.78   0.435    -.0456669    .0196484 
 unexplained |   .3554492   .0156946    22.65   0.000     .3246883    .3862101 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D4  OR       | 
   explained |   .0968168   .0116688     8.30   0.000     .0739463    .1196873 
 unexplained |   .2456231   .0110013    22.33   0.000      .224061    .2671853 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Fig. 18 – Gender Wage Gap Decompositions, Personal Characteristics Regressions
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Appendix 4. Selectivity correction
 
• Age 
• Age
2
 
• Educational Attainments  
o Illiterate or No schooling (E0) 
o Primary school (E1) 
o Middle-School (E2) 
o High-School (E3) 
o 2 years university (E4) 
o > 2 years university (E5) 
• Married (married) 
• Number of children (nbchild) 
• Having children (child) 
• Having children aged less than 3 (achild03) 
• Household’s size  (hldsize) 
• Households’ other income (lotherincome) 
• Village/City (village) 
• Housing owner/ Not owner (owner) 
• Geographic Localisation 
o Marmara (marmara) 
o Aegean (ege) 
o Mediterranean (mediterranee) 
o Central Anatolia (anatolyC) 
o Southeast Anatolia (anatolySE) 
o Eastern Anatolia (anatolyE) 
o Black Sea (bsea) 
                              In red are indicated the reference situations 
 
 
 Fig. 19 – Exogenous Variables of The Selection Equation
40
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =     14278 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =      1104 
                                                Uncensored obs     =     13174 
                                                Wald chi2(50)      =   7065.51 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logsalaire   | 
          E1 |   .0805174   .0317353     2.54   0.011     .0183172    .1427175 
          E2 |   .0980777   .0351019     2.79   0.005     .0292792    .1668761 
          E3 |    .347319   .0349373     9.94   0.000     .2788431    .4157948 
          E4 |   .4249115   .0477437     8.90   0.000     .3313356    .5184873 
          E5 |   .6327434   .0442034    14.31   0.000     .5461064    .7193804 
         exp |   .0219195   .0026793     8.18   0.000     .0166682    .0271709 
        exp2 |  -.0003529    .000052    -6.78   0.000    -.0004548   -.0002509 
      tenure |   .0306514    .002274    13.48   0.000     .0261944    .0351084 
     tenure2 |  -.0006742   .0000801    -8.42   0.000    -.0008311   -.0005173 
     nbchild |   .0017849   .0041362     0.43   0.666    -.0063218    .0098916 
      lhours |   .1114544   .0142554     7.82   0.000     .0835144    .1393944 
    parttime |  -.0905585   .0307589    -2.94   0.003     -.150845   -.0302721 
      public |   .2267205   .0208464    10.88   0.000     .1858623    .2675787 
         cdd |   .1371197     .02748     4.99   0.000     .0832599    .1909794 
         cdi |    .258588   .0277428     9.32   0.000     .2042131     .312963 
           M |   .3500328   .0263467    13.29   0.000     .2983942    .4016713 
           P |   .2013565   .0247058     8.15   0.000      .152934    .2497791 
           E |   .0680054    .016573     4.10   0.000     .0355229    .1004878 
          SW |    .072886   .0149471     4.88   0.000     .0435903    .1021818 
          S2 |   .0686469   .0372579     1.84   0.065    -.0043773    .1416711 
          S3 |    .170998   .0341817     5.00   0.000     .1040031    .2379929 
          S4 |   .0407018   .0383856     1.06   0.289    -.0345325    .1159361 
          S5 |   .0042529   .0421874     0.10   0.920     -.078433    .0869387 
          S6 |   .2222775   .0395248     5.62   0.000     .1448103    .2997447 
          S7 |   .1169858    .044736     2.62   0.009     .0293048    .2046667 
          S8 |  -.1345371   .0396753    -3.39   0.001    -.2122993   -.0567749 
          S9 |  -.1398725   .0393309    -3.56   0.000    -.2169596   -.0627854 
    firmsize |   .0683701    .005419    12.62   0.000      .057749    .0789912 
       union |   .1082418   .0179113     6.04   0.000     .0731362    .1433474 
        secu |   .1600068   .0147648    10.84   0.000     .1310683    .1889452 
     village |  -.0357005   .0149263    -2.39   0.017    -.0649556   -.0064455 
         ege |  -.0228801   .0222378    -1.03   0.304    -.0664653    .0207052 
mediterranee |  -.0207026   .0225827    -0.92   0.359    -.0649638    .0235586 
     marmara |   .1627092   .0199598     8.15   0.000     .1235887    .2018297 
   anatolySE |  -.0118938    .025496    -0.47   0.641     -.061865    .0380775 
    anatolyC |   .0627955   .0211614     2.97   0.003       .02132    .1042711 
    anatolyE |    .010854   .0271277     0.40   0.689    -.0423153    .0640232 
       _cons |   4.216805   .0825403    51.09   0.000     4.055029    4.378581 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
select       | 
         age |   .2148792   .0113319    18.96   0.000     .1926691    .2370893 
        age2 |  -.0027844    .000145   -19.20   0.000    -.0030686   -.0025001 
          E1 |   .1590545   .0874916     1.82   0.069     -.012426    .3305349 
          E2 |   .5342694   .0956946     5.58   0.000     .3467115    .7218273 
          E3 |  -.0587604   .0895366    -0.66   0.512    -.2342489    .1167281 
          E4 |   .2116292   .1437064     1.47   0.141    -.0700302    .4932887 
          E5 |   .4171016   .1179097     3.54   0.000     .1860029    .6482003 
     married |   .6728287   .0647033    10.40   0.000     .5460126    .7996448 
     nbchild |   .0471219   .0184835     2.55   0.011     .0108949    .0833489 
       child |  -.2545335   .0835249    -3.05   0.002    -.4182392   -.0908278 
    achild06 |   .0726129   .0501705     1.45   0.148    -.0257194    .1709452 
   hshldsize |  -.0633912    .012848    -4.93   0.000    -.0885729   -.0382096 
       owner |  -.1944177   .0428516    -4.54   0.000    -.2784053   -.1104301 
lotherincome |   -.022106   .0094355    -2.34   0.019    -.0405992   -.0036128 
     village |  -.1264692   .0453281    -2.79   0.005    -.2153106   -.0376279 
         ege |   .2084584   .0757282     2.75   0.006     .0600339     .356883 
mediterranee |   .0474315   .0732524     0.65   0.517    -.0961404    .1910035 
     marmara |   .1867294   .0661053     2.82   0.005     .0571654    .3162934 
   anatolySE |    .172619   .0842538     2.05   0.040     .0074845    .3377534 
    anatolyC |  -.0611026   .0679612    -0.90   0.369     -.194304    .0720988 
    anatolyE |   .0908962   .0889152     1.02   0.307    -.0833745    .2651669 
       _cons |  -2.263896    .214139   -10.57   0.000    -2.683601   -1.844192 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |  -.6403809   .0563855   -11.36   0.000    -.7508944   -.5298674 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   -1.00000 
       sigma |   .6403809 
      lambda |  -.6403809   .0563855 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fig. 20 – Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equation, Men aged 15-64.
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Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =     24735 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =     21434 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      3301 
                                                Wald chi2(50)      =   4922.42 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logsalaire   | 
          E1 |   .0475223   .0406504     1.17   0.242    -.0321509    .1271956 
          E2 |   .0661214   .0504009     1.31   0.190    -.0326627    .1649054 
          E3 |   .2461262   .0526209     4.68   0.000     .1429911    .3492613 
          E4 |   .3441189   .0717725     4.79   0.000     .2034473    .4847904 
          E5 |   .5441977   .0733629     7.42   0.000     .4004091    .6879863 
         exp |    .027959   .0027577    10.14   0.000     .0225541     .033364 
        exp2 |  -.0005472   .0000617    -8.87   0.000    -.0006681   -.0004263 
      tenure |   .0316471    .004066     7.78   0.000     .0236779    .0396162 
     tenure2 |   -.000928   .0001554    -5.97   0.000    -.0012325   -.0006235 
     nbchild |  -.0262485   .0070586    -3.72   0.000    -.0400832   -.0124139 
      lhours |   .2726962   .0195456    13.95   0.000     .2343876    .3110049 
    parttime |  -.1136984   .0335813    -3.39   0.001    -.1795166   -.0478803 
      public |    .173582   .0391819     4.43   0.000     .0967869    .2503771 
         cdd |  -.0408062   .0395626    -1.03   0.302    -.1183475    .0367351 
         cdi |   .2480316    .043374     5.72   0.000     .1630202     .333043 
           M |   .4045585   .0484526     8.35   0.000     .3095931    .4995239 
           P |   .2357226   .0417624     5.64   0.000     .1538698    .3175754 
           E |   .0537518   .0322312     1.67   0.095    -.0094201    .1169237 
          SW |  -.0401566   .0344544    -1.17   0.244     -.107686    .0273727 
          S2 |   .1069526   .0497177     2.15   0.031     .0095077    .2043976 
          S3 |   .1998711   .1356347     1.47   0.141    -.0659681    .4657103 
          S4 |   .1762498   .0558999     3.15   0.002      .066688    .2858117 
          S5 |   .1799581   .0747573     2.41   0.016     .0334364    .3264798 
          S6 |   .3072332   .0765603     4.01   0.000     .1571778    .4572885 
          S7 |   .1910668   .0600491     3.18   0.001     .0733728    .3087608 
          S8 |   .1004023   .0589867     1.70   0.089    -.0152095    .2160142 
          S9 |   .3201576   .0456894     7.01   0.000      .230608    .4097073 
    firmsize |   .0589813   .0094454     6.24   0.000     .0404687    .0774939 
       union |   .0856162   .0346126     2.47   0.013     .0177767    .1534557 
        secu |   .3399746   .0277707    12.24   0.000     .2855449    .3944042 
     village |  -.0313304   .0278896    -1.12   0.261     -.085993    .0233323 
         ege |   .0374439     .03583     1.05   0.296    -.0327817    .1076695 
mediterranee |  -.0236507   .0370871    -0.64   0.524    -.0963401    .0490388 
     marmara |   .2212065   .0331622     6.67   0.000     .1562097    .2862032 
   anatolySE |   .0716831   .0518114     1.38   0.166    -.0298653    .1732315 
    anatolyC |    .116557   .0372317     3.13   0.002     .0435841    .1895299 
    anatolyE |   .0308254   .0537568     0.57   0.566    -.0745359    .1361868 
       _cons |   3.266545   .1142887    28.58   0.000     3.042543    3.490547 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
select       | 
         age |   .0957613   .0077545    12.35   0.000     .0805629    .1109598 
        age2 |  -.0013844   .0001059   -13.07   0.000     -.001592   -.0011769 
          E1 |  -.0557257   .0391383    -1.42   0.154    -.1324354     .020984 
          E2 |   .0712766    .049603     1.44   0.151    -.0259435    .1684967 
          E3 |   .3667918   .0447136     8.20   0.000     .2791547    .4544288 
          E4 |   1.560887   .0851254    18.34   0.000     1.394044    1.727729 
          E5 |   1.813611   .0641634    28.27   0.000     1.687853    1.939369 
     married |  -.8152702   .0369846   -22.04   0.000    -.8877586   -.7427817 
     nbchild |    .031346   .0142129     2.21   0.027     .0034893    .0592027 
       child |  -.0463621   .0457743    -1.01   0.311     -.136078    .0433538 
    achild06 |  -.3220182   .0311703   -10.33   0.000    -.3831109   -.2609254 
   hshldsize |  -.0429302   .0103641    -4.14   0.000    -.0632435    -.022617 
       owner |  -.3216489   .0256487   -12.54   0.000    -.3719193   -.2713784 
lotherincome |   .1460857   .0096682    15.11   0.000     .1271364     .165035 
     village |   .0302942   .0312508     0.97   0.332    -.0309562    .0915445 
         ege |   .3234399   .0461696     7.01   0.000     .2329491    .4139306 
mediterranee |   .1642189   .0474809     3.46   0.001      .071158    .2572798 
     marmara |   .2849919   .0416829     6.84   0.000     .2032949    .3666889 
   anatolySE |  -.3870299   .0607728    -6.37   0.000    -.5061423   -.2679174 
    anatolyC |  -.1533925   .0470612    -3.26   0.001    -.2456308   -.0611542 
    anatolyE |  -.3833386   .0661209    -5.80   0.000    -.5129332    -.253744 
       _cons |  -1.860626   .1382635   -13.46   0.000    -2.131617   -1.589634 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |  -.0706864   .0309659    -2.28   0.022    -.1313785   -.0099943 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   -0.13941 
       sigma |  .50704126 
      lambda | -.07068641   .0309659 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fig. 21 – Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equation, Women aged 15-64.
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                         Mean prediction Male Wage in logarithms   =  6.030253 
                         Mean prediction Female Wage in logarithms =  5.696181 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Wage Gap   |   .3340723    .040755     8.20   0.000      .254194    .4139506 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D1 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |   .1089408   .0133023     8.19   0.000     .0828686    .1350129 
 unexplained |   .2251315   .0400766     5.62   0.000     .1465828    .3036802 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D2 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |   .0986904   .0158306     6.23   0.000     .0676631    .1297177 
 unexplained |   .2353819   .0433406     5.43   0.000     .1504359    .3203279 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D3 Reimers   | 
   explained |     .08844   .0234063     3.78   0.000     .0425645    .1343155 
 unexplained |   .2456323   .0487265     5.04   0.000     .1501301    .3411345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D4  OR       | 
   explained |   .1611295   .0149187    10.80   0.000     .1318894    .1903695 
 unexplained |   .1729428   .0317786     5.44   0.000     .1106579    .2352277 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Fig. 22 – Selectivity-Corrected Gender Wage Gap Decompositions.
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Appendix 5. Comparison with EU countries
   Mean prediction Male Wage in logarithms   =  6.073556 
   Mean prediction Female Wage in logarithms =  5.817989 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Wage Gap   |   .2555675   .0201932    12.66   0.000     .2159895    .2951455 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D1 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |   .0431015   .0154708     2.79   0.005     .0127793    .0734238 
 unexplained |    .212466   .0146485    14.50   0.000     .1837554    .2411766 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D2 Oaxaca    | 
   explained |  -.0005208   .0188111    -0.03   0.978    -.0373899    .0363483 
 unexplained |   .2560883   .0158068    16.20   0.000     .2251077     .287069 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D3 Reimers   | 
   explained |  -.0441431   .0270401    -1.63   0.103    -.0971407    .0088544 
 unexplained |   .2997106   .0234078    12.80   0.000     .2538322    .3455891 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
D4  OR       | 
   explained |   .0843263   .0160274     5.26   0.000     .0529132    .1157394 
 unexplained |   .1712412   .0108148    15.83   0.000     .1500446    .1924378 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Fig. 23 – Gender Wage Gap Decompositions, Wage-Earners aged 25-55 and working at least 15h./week.
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Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   Number of obs      =     17513 
(regression model with sample selection)        Censored obs       =     15394 
                                                Uncensored obs     =      2119 
                                                Wald chi2(50)      =   3188.57 
                                                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
logsalaire   | 
          E1 |   .0126405   .0521596     0.24   0.809    -.0895903    .1148714 
          E2 |   .0246545   .0706477     0.35   0.727    -.1138124    .1631215 
          E3 |   .2498201   .0718019     3.48   0.001      .109091    .3905492 
          E4 |   .3554263   .0928083     3.83   0.000     .1735254    .5373272 
          E5 |   .5352937   .0952296     5.62   0.000     .3486471    .7219403 
         exp |   .0334065   .0053826     6.21   0.000     .0228569    .0439561 
        exp2 |  -.0006882    .000117    -5.88   0.000    -.0009175    -.000459 
      tenure |   .0326407   .0051855     6.29   0.000     .0224773    .0428041 
     tenure2 |  -.0010596   .0002149    -4.93   0.000    -.0014809   -.0006383 
   nbrenfant |  -.0276689   .0099823    -2.77   0.006    -.0472339   -.0081039 
      lhours |   .2583888   .0548352     4.71   0.000     .1509139    .3658638 
    parttime |  -.1979934   .0544035    -3.64   0.000    -.3046222   -.0913646 
      public |   .1238155    .045746     2.71   0.007      .034155    .2134761 
         cdd |  -.0651499    .048323    -1.35   0.178    -.1598612    .0295614 
         cdi |   .2517396   .0578213     4.35   0.000      .138412    .3650672 
           M |   .5240518   .0583184     8.99   0.000     .4097499    .6383537 
           P |   .3622066   .0540332     6.70   0.000     .2563035    .4681097 
           E |   .0791441   .0406158     1.95   0.051    -.0004614    .1587496 
          SW |  -.0854937   .0452379    -1.89   0.059    -.1741583     .003171 
          S2 |   .1869595   .0637483     2.93   0.003      .062015    .3119039 
          S3 |   .2947628   .1682872     1.75   0.080     -.035074    .6245997 
          S4 |   .2528537   .0740214     3.42   0.001     .1077744     .397933 
          S5 |   .1899865   .0920476     2.06   0.039     .0095765    .3703965 
          S6 |   .3965321   .0915278     4.33   0.000     .2171409    .5759234 
          S7 |   .3166392   .0758072     4.18   0.000     .1680597    .4652186 
          S8 |   .1472659   .0724104     2.03   0.042     .0053442    .2891876 
          S9 |   .5460807   .0557059     9.80   0.000     .4368992    .6552622 
   taillense |   .0701946   .0119535     5.87   0.000     .0467662    .0936231 
    syndicat |   .0823952   .0371689     2.22   0.027     .0095456    .1552449 
        secu |    .292113   .0403122     7.25   0.000     .2131026    .3711234 
     village |  -.0728343   .0359336    -2.03   0.043    -.1432629   -.0024056 
         ege |  -.0068048   .0423789    -0.16   0.872    -.0898659    .0762563 
mediterranee |  -.0250364   .0448666    -0.56   0.577    -.1129734    .0629006 
     marmara |   .1826068   .0395844     4.61   0.000     .1050229    .2601908 
   anatolySE |   .0830969   .0647789     1.28   0.200    -.0438674    .2100613 
    anatolyC |   .0823729   .0442612     1.86   0.063    -.0043774    .1691232 
    anatolyE |  -.0192642   .0609868    -0.32   0.752     -.138796    .1002677 
       _cons |   3.192086   .2464822    12.95   0.000      2.70899    3.675182 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
select       | 
         age |   .1408823   .0186427     7.56   0.000     .1043432    .1774214 
        age2 |  -.0020635   .0002419    -8.53   0.000    -.0025375   -.0015894 
          E1 |  -.0182484   .0481941    -0.38   0.705    -.1127072    .0762103 
          E2 |   .0876279   .0675199     1.30   0.194    -.0447088    .2199646 
          E3 |   .5077147   .0564177     9.00   0.000      .397138    .6182914 
          E4 |   1.669557   .0989713    16.87   0.000     1.475576    1.863537 
          E5 |   1.964004   .0741888    26.47   0.000     1.818596    2.109411 
       marie |  -.7496005    .045911   -16.33   0.000    -.8395843   -.6596167 
   nbrenfant |  -.0091625   .0198289    -0.46   0.644    -.0480263    .0297014 
       child |   .0095924   .0581523     0.16   0.869    -.1043841    .1235689 
    achild06 |  -.4006475   .0387525   -10.34   0.000     -.476601    -.324694 
taillemenage |    -.02737   .0138509    -1.98   0.048    -.0545172   -.0002229 
     proprio |  -.2848494   .0313091    -9.10   0.000     -.346214   -.2234847 
lotherincome |   .1445781   .0105106    13.76   0.000     .1239777    .1651786 
     village |   .0748762   .0400321     1.87   0.061    -.0035852    .1533376 
         ege |   .2915282   .0565676     5.15   0.000     .1806577    .4023987 
mediterranee |   .1490794   .0590785     2.52   0.012     .0332876    .2648711 
     marmara |   .2189862   .0514818     4.25   0.000     .1180837    .3198888 
   anatolySE |  -.2911412   .0801492    -3.63   0.000    -.4482307   -.1340517 
    anatolyC |  -.1127509   .0583451    -1.93   0.053    -.2271052    .0016034 
    anatolyE |  -.2222761   .0813072    -2.73   0.006    -.3816353    -.062917 
       _cons |  -2.764777   .3496883    -7.91   0.000    -3.450153     -2.0794 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mills        | 
      lambda |  -.0260707   .0373418    -0.70   0.485    -.0992594    .0471179 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   -0.05291 
       sigma |  .49277185 
      lambda | -.02607072   .0373418 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Fig. 24 – Selectivity-Corrected Wage Equation, Females aged 25-55 and working at least 15h./week.
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